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Treble Damages for Violations of the
Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested
Analysis and Application of the RICO
Civil Cause of Action
Louis C. Long*
I. Introduction: The Need to Pursue Alternative Civil Remedies
for Securities Fraud
Two discernable lines of Supreme Court decisions have
emerged under the federal securities laws.' Both demonstrate a
gradual departure2 from the salutary purposes that underly the regu-
lation of the securities industry.3
* B.A. Temple University 1976; J.D. Temple University 1980. Law Clerk for the Hon-
orable J. Sydney Hoffman of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
1. The nucleus of federal statutory regulation of the securities industry is five acts: the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act], the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78o (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act]; the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as PUHC]; the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa to 77bbbb (1976) [hereinafter
cited as TIA]; the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to 80a-52 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as ICA]; and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21
(1976) [hereinafter cited as IAA]. Additionally, Congress has passed the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa to 78111 (1976). These statutes will be hereinafter
collectively referred to as the federal securities laws.
2. See generally Freeman, Implied Remedies Under Rule lOb-5." Are They Only/or De-
frauded Sellers, NAT'L. L.J., Dec. 10, 1979, at 26; Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Under Rule 10b-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1898 n. 124
(1978).
3. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), presented a situa-
tion in which an investment advisor was scalping his advisory clients. The Court held that the
practice of selling securities as a principal to the client without making a full disclosure of the
adverse interest of the advisor was a fraudulent and deceitful practice justifying injunctive
relief. Id at 196-97. The Court summarized the policies underlying the federal securities laws
as follows:
A fundamental purpose, common to these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy offull
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry. As we recently said in a related context, "It
requires but little appreciation ...of what happened in this country during the
1920's and 1930's to realize how essential it is that the highest ethical standards pre-
vail" in every facet of the securities industry.
Id at 186-87 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted) (quoting Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963)). Thus, "Congress intended securities legislation enacted for
the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
One series of cases threatens to remove from the courts implied
causes of action4 for damages. Since Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., I federal courts have consistently provided civil relief to plain-
tiffs injured as a result of a violation of the federal securities laws.
6
The Supreme Court has grudgingly acquiesced in this proliferation.'
Recent decisions, however, indicate a decided trend toward the abo-
lition of implied civil remedies.8 The high-water mark9 of implied
civil remedies was Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas-
ually Co., " in which the Supreme Court chose, uncharacteristically,
"not [to] read § 10(b) as narrowly as the Court of Appeals. ... ""
Since that time, however, the Court has struck down each case as-
serting a new implied cause of action under the federal securities
effectuate its remedial purposes.'" Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 151 (1972). Accord, Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971).
4. Each of the federal securities laws passed between 1933 and 1940 contains a specific
or express liability provision. III L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1683 (2d ed. 1961). For a
thorough discussion of these provisions, see id at 1683-1757. More recently and more expan-
sively, the lower federal judiciary has implied civil causes of action under other provisions,
especially section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). III L. Loss, supra at 1683,
1759, 1763-97. See also I A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODI-
TIES FRAUD, §§ 2.1-2.7, 12.1 (1979). To some extent the distinction between express and im-
plied causes of action will be rendered moot if Congress enacts the proposed code promulgated
by the American Law Institute. See L. Loss, INTRODUCTION TO ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES
CODE liv-lv (Proposed Official Draft March 15, 1978) [hereinafter cited as ALl Codel.
5. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In an oft-cited passage, Judge Kirkpatrick inferred a
cause of action from the purpose of the 1934 Act despite the omission of an express civil
remedy for a violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder.
Of course, the legislature may withhold from parties injured the right to recover
damages arising by reason of violation of a statute but the right is so fundamental
and so deeply ingrained in the law that where it is not expressly denied the intention
to withhold it should appear very clearly and plainly. . . . In other words, in view of
the genera/purpose of the Act, the mere omission of an express pro visionfor civil liabil-
ity is not sufficient to negative what the general law implies.
Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
6. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 844-92 (4th ed.
1977); 111 L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1763-97.
7. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.19 (1979); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 n.13 (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. I, 25 (1977); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
8. Freeman, supra note 2, at 3 1. See also Pillai, Negative Implication." the Demise of
Private Rights ofAction in the Federal Courts, 47 CINN. L. REV. 1 (1978), which states the
following:
Implied remedies under federal statutes are an endangered species. The doctrine
of implication, which owed its day-to-day existence to the unexpressed and often
imagined intent of Congress, never had a secure foundation in remedial jurispru-
dence. As is clear from its evolution under the generous patronage of the Warren
Court and its dissolution by the inhospitable Burger Court, the concept is too fragile
to exist independently of changing judicial attitudes towards social justice. The Cort-
Piper rules of implication can easily be seen as preordained reasons for the denial of
private remedies, rather than as clarifying rules for illuminating the doctrine of im-
plication.
Id at 40-41.
9. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 225 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
10. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
11. Id. at 12.
laws,' 2
The other line of cases limits the cause of action, once implied,
although no statutory or regulatory language specifically requires
such a limitation.' 3 The first case to impose such a limitation was
12. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (the IAA
provides an implied cause of action under section 215 for equitable relief from void investment
contracts but section 206, the anti-fraud measure, does not provide an implied right of recov-
ery of damages); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 567, 576 (1979) (no cause of
action under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42
(1977) (no cause of action under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act). Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975) (18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) created no implied right to maintain a derivative action for
damages); National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass., 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (no
implied cause of action under Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970). But see Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979) (implied cause of action for violation of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implied cause of action
under section 901(a) of the Education Amendments of 1972); Bivins v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment violation provides an implied civil
action for damages); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (section 14(a) of the 1934 Act
provides an implied right of action). See generally Williams, Chairman's Letter of Transmit-
tal, 44 SEC Ann. Rep. vii (1979).
The ALl Code, supra note 4, § 1722(a), would avoid the implication problem. It would
provide a court with the power to recognize an implied cause of action under certain circum-
stances. It provides:
(a) Implied actions. A court, considering the nature of the defendant's conduct,
the degree of his culpability, the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and the deterrent
effect of recognizing a private action based on a violation of a provision of this Code
(as defined in section 225), may recognize such an action even though it is not ex-
pressly created by part XVII, but only if (1) the action is not inconsistent with the
conditions or restrictions in any of the actions expressly created or with the scheme of
the Code, (2) the provision, rule, or order is designed for the special benefit of a class
of persons to which the plaintiff belongs against the kind of harm alleged, (3) the
plaintiff satisfies the court that under the circumstances the type of remedy sought is
not disproportionate to the alleged violation, and (4) in cases comparable to those
dealt with in section 1702(e)(2) or 1708(c)(2) or a similar provision that specifies a
maximum measure of damages, a comparable maximum is imposed.
Id.
Although section 1722(a) purports to reflect the test enunciated in Cort v. Ash, the more
recent decisions would appear to cast it in doubt. For example, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977), has added a requirement that unless the new cause of action is
necessary to prevent a frustration of congressional purpose, no implied remedy should arise.
Additionally, section 1722(a) fails to consider the impact of the other decisions discussed
above. See notes 7-11, supra. See generally Lowenfels, The Case Against the Proposed Federal
Securities Code, 65 VA. L. REV. 615, 658-59 (1979).
13. See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). Although
writing far in advance of the Supreme Court's limiting decisions, Judge Feinberg has proven
quite prophetic.
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 have been the focal point for a spectacular growth
in the law governing civil liability for transactions in securities. This has been all the
more remarkable because the Act does not explicitly provide a private civil remedy
for violations of the section and the Rule, and the Supreme Court has never held that
one exists. . . . Nevertheless, it is now common ground that an injured investor does
have a private cause of action under Rule lOb-5. However various concepts have
been utilized to limit liability under the sweeping language of the Rule, although
none is specifically required by it. Thus, a requirement of privity was first suggested,
but has more recently been ignored. However, the search for limiting doctrine has
continued. Thus, some courts have looked to see whether a plaintiff actually relied.
on the allegedly fraudulent statement, whether such reliance was reasonable, whether
the fraud actually caused the harm to plaintiff, whether the plaintiffs injury was for-
seeable, and whether plaintiff falls within the category of a buyer or seller of securi-
ties.
Id at 543-44 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, "4 which held that a plaintiff
in a rule 10b-5 i action must have been a purchaser or a seller of the
security to have standing to assert a claim under the rule. I6 The next
significant development came in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, '7 in
which the Court held that in the absence of any allegation of scien-
ter, no cause of action will lie under section 10(b) and rule l0b-5."8
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., "9 continued the narrowing
trend by holding that actions under rule 14a-920 required a showing
of materiality, which "is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider [the fact misstated or omitted] . ..im-
portant in deciding [his course of conduct] .. ."2 Implied causes
of action under section 10(b) for mere corporate mismanagement or
similar breach of fiduciary duty actionable under state law were
abolished in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 22 because the statute
requires manipulation or deception.23 Most recently, in Chiarella v.
14. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as rule lob-5].
16. 421 U.S. at 730-31. The Court reasoned that: (i) the congressional acquiescence in
the construction of the language "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security..."
notwithstanding attempts by the SEC to adopt a more liberal standard; (ii) the precise state-
ments of more liberal standards in other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts; (iii) the section
28(a) limitation of "actual damages" prohibited recovery of speculative or conjectural dam-
ages; and (iv) the danger of vexatious litigation all pointed to the purchaser-seller standing
requirement. Significantly, the Court expressly affirmed both the holding and the analysis of
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952). 421 U.S. at 731, 749. Ironically, although Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. was cited
with favor, the Court underscored that it had not expressly held that an implied cause of action
existed:
This Court had no occasion to deal with the subject until 25 years later, and at that
time we confirmed with virtually no discussion the overwhelming consensus of the
District Courts and the Courts of Appeals that such a cause of action did exist.
Id at 730.
17. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
18. Id at 193. The Court first looked to the language of the statute, particularly the
words "manipulative and deceptive" used in conjunction with "device or contrivance," and
conclued that Congress must have intended to bar all such practices other than those which
were done in a negligent manner. Id at 199. The Court buttressed its conclusion with a
comparison to other provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts in which Congress mandated a lesser
standard of liability. 1d at 206-10. A final rationale underlying the scienter requirement was
the preservation of the procedural distinctions between the express causes of action and the
implied cause of action. Id at 210-11.
19. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1979).
21. 426 U.S. at 449. Justice Marshall, without a dissent, embraced two circuit court rul-
ings that employed the stricter tort standard of materiality: whether a reasonable man would
attach importance to the omitted or misstated fact. Id at 445-46, 448-49. This, he reasoned,
was consistent with the dicta in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), which
stated that "the defect [must] have a significant propensity to affect the voting process." 426
U.S. at 449.
22. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
23. Id at 473-74 (citations omitted).
The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any
conduct not involving manipulation or deception. Nor have we been cited to any
evidence in the legislative history that would support a departure from the language
of the statute. "When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and
deception, . . . and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite
unwilling to extend the scope of the statute ...." Thus the claim of fraud and
United States,24 the Court reversed a conviction on the grounds that
silence in connection with the purchase or sale of a security may rise
to an actionable fraud under section 10(b) only if a duty to disclose
exists arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between the
parties to the transaction.
This article will provide a suggested analysis of a viable alterna-
tive to the endangered26 implied cause of action. Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 197027 provides an express cause of
action for treble damages28 that can be applied to violations of the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.29  Although the
act does not create a new securities violation,3" it provides significant
advantages over existing securities fraud theory: treble damages and
an express statutory basis for maintaining the action.3' Despite the
fiduciary breach in this complaint states a cause of action under any part of Rule lOb-
5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as "manipulative or deceptive"
within the meaning of the statute.
Id.
24. 445 U.S. 222 (1980), rev'g, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
25. 445 U.S. at 226. Chiarella, an employee of a financial printing company, had de-
duced the names of target companies from the various offering documents and information
therein. Without making any disclosures, Chiarella purchased stock of the targets and sold the
shares immediately after the knowledge of the takeover attempts became public. Id at 4250.
The jury had been instructed that defendant could be convicted "merely because of his failure
to disclose material, nonpublic information to sellers from whom he bought the stock of the
target corporations." Id. at 4253-54. In reversing the lower court, Justice Powell reasoned that
"not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b) ...
land] the element required to make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this
case..." because defendant was not the seller's agent, fiduciary or any other person in whom
the sellers had reposed their trust. Id at 4252. The Chief Justice gathered three other votes in
support of his theory that section 10(b) applies to any "person who has misappropriated non-
public information [and it creates] ...an absolute duty to disclose that information or to
refrain from trading." Id at 4255 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Brennan, Blackmun and Mar-
shall, J.J., concurred in that analysis).
26. See Pillai, supra note 8, at 40.
27. Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 922, 941-47 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1976)) [Title IX of the act will be hereinafter cited as RICO.] See note 35 infra.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976) provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1976).
30. Indeed, RICO depends upon existing law to define the prohibited conduct.
3 1. RICO is not a panacea for all of the ills created by the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court under the federal securities laws. See notes 1-25 and accompanying text supra.
Therefore, one may credibly contend that the existence of a RICO-securities cause of action,
dependent as it is upon the substantive law as limited by the holdings of the Court, merely
compounds the problems for prospective plaintiffs. Quite to the contrary, however, RICO has
significant advantages for those in plaintiff's posture. First, the prospect of treble damages and
the recovery of attorneys' fees should be significant incentives to undertake the new theory and
the increased burdens that it imposes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). Second, the RICO-
securities action is expressly created by statute and, therefore, not subject to the vicissitudes of
the Burger Court. Id But see notes 1-12 and accompanying text supra. Third, to the extent
that there has been no sale, or to the extent that the thing sold is not a security, RICO provides
civil relief theretofore unavailable under the federal securities laws because mail fraud and
wire fraud can now be the bases of civil recovery. See e.g., Parnes v. Heinold Commodities,
Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1980). RICO is also beneficial to the Securities and Exchange
apparent applicability to a broad range of conduct, few private dam-
ages actions have been commenced under this statutory theory.32
Those that have been brought have floundered.33 It is hoped that
this article will serve as a primer to encourage the further develop-
ment of this much neglected remedy.34
II. An Overview of the RICO35 Civil Liability Provisions
Congress, for the last three decades, has expended considerable
energy investigating and attempting to regulate organized crime.36
Much of that effort culminated on October 15, 1970 with the passage
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.37 The legislative pro-
Commission because it provides broad equitable relief including divestiture, forfeiture and
more severe criminal sanctions. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1966, 1968 with note 34 infra.
32. Research has revealed thirteen relevant opinions, four of which are available on
LEXIS only: Cullen v. Margotti, 618 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1980) (no proof of nexus between
extortion and interstate commerce); State of Maryland v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F.
Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1980) (motion to dismiss denied); Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott &
Co., 495 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D. La. 1980) (summary judgment vacated); Parnes v. Heinold Com-
modities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. II. 1980) (motion to dismiss denied); Angelilli v. Mur-
phy, Nos. 79 Civ. 5983-CSH and 79 Civ. 6018-CSH (S.D.N.Y. January 2, 1980); Amanini v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 63,010 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1979) (pertinent
portions deleted by publisher, full text available on LEXIS); Green v. Bartholomew, No. 78-
3994 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1979) (motion of defendant Moorehead for summary judgment granted
because nothing remotely resembling racketeering was alleged); Green v. Bartholomew, No.
78-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1979) (motion of seven defendants for summary judgment
granted); Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978)
(motion of defendant Pennington denied); Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., No.
76-122 (D. Del. April 25, 1978) (motion of defendant Cohen denied); City of Chicago v. Bi-
landic, No. 77-4471 (N.D. Ill. April 17, 1978); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Three civil actions brought by the government under section 1964 have produced pub-
lished opinions. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974) (injunction
granted), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (relief denied); United States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
33. But see State of Maryland v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 255 (D. Md.
1980); Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 495 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D. La. 1980): Parnes v.
Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell
Mortgage Corp., No. 76-122 (D. Del. April 25, 1978). Each of these cases except Ingram sur-
vived a motion to dismiss Ingram survived a motion for summary judgment on an unrelated
issue.
34. See Note, The Securities and Exchange Commission.- An Introduction to the Enforce-
ment of the Criminal Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 151
(1979). See also Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Waterfront'" RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341 (1980); Jacobs, Judicial and Administrative Remedies Available to the
SECfor Breaches of Rule lOb-5, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 397 (1979).
35. RICO is an acronym for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, the
descriptive title given by Congress to Chapter 96, which was added to Title 18 of the United
States Code by section 90 1(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, supra note 27. All
too frequently these provisions are cited incorrectly by the courts. E.g., United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 575 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978).
36. See In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 46-9 (2d Cir. 1975) (collecting countless legislative
reports and other authorities). See generally Symposium: White-Collar Crime, 17 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 271-301 (1980); Symposium.- Organized Crime, 20 J. Pu. L. 33 (1975).
37. Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-04, 84 Stat. 922, 941-47 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1976)). The assault on organized crime has not lost its fervor. Eg., National Advisory
on Crim. Justice Standards and Goals, Organized Crime (1976) [hereinafter cited as Task
ceedings prior to passage of the act underscore the concern of Con-
gress with the economic impact of organized criminal activities.38
Indeed, one court has observed that the "[riecurrent themes running
throughout the legislative history include the diversity of organized
crime, its penetration into virtually every phase of the nation's eco-
nomic and political life, the infiltration of, and dependence upon,
political institutions by persons engaged in organized crime, and the
ineffectiveness of past enforcement efforts."39
RICO was an innovative step in the regulation of illegal, albeit
economic, activity.4° Congress' action was a curious mixture4' of in-
Force Report]. See generally Atkinson, "'Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, " 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1 (1978); Blakey & Gettings, RICO: Evening up the Odds, TRIAL, October, 1980, at 58; Brad-
ley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts.- An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837 (1980);
McClellan, The Organized Crme Act (S. 30) or its Critics. Which Threatens Civil Liberties, 46
NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1970) (Senator McClellan was the prime sponsor of that piece of
legislation); Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime. Highlighting the Challenging New Frontier
in Criminal Law, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 41 (1970) (then Assistant Attorney General Wilson
testified on behalf of RICO); Symposium. White-Colar Crime, supra note 35; Symposium.
Organized Crime, supra note 35; Comment, Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970. An Analysis of lssues Arising in its Interpretation, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 89 (1977) [herein-
after cited as An Analysis ofRICO]; Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legiti-
mate Business. Civil Remediesfor "Criminal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192 (1975) (general
focus on governmental civil remedies for violations of RICO) [hereinafter cited as Infiltration
ofLegitimate Business]; Note, Equitable Law Enforcement and the Organized Crime ControlAct
of 1970, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 508 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Equitable Law Enforcemeni;
Note, Criminal Law--Enforcing Criminal Laws Through Civil Proceedings Section 1964 ofthe
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.SC. § 1964 (1970), 53 TEX. L. REV. 1055 (1975)
(focus upon diverstiture as a viable remedy in a governmental civil action) [hereinafter cited as
Enforcing Criminal Laws]; Note, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, U. MICH. J.L. 546, 622-
27 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Organized Crime; Note, Elliott v. United States: Conspiracy
Law and the Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime through RICO, 65 U. VA. L. R EV. 109 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Rico Conspiracy]; Note, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act. An Analysis ofthe Confusion in its Application and a Proposalfor Reform, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 441 (1980); Note, Investing Dirty Money. Section 1962(a) ofthe Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491 (1974) (general focus on government's burden of proof and
ambiguous language in Section 1962(a)) [hereinafter cited as Investing Dirty Money]. See also
Comment, The Pennsylvania Attack on Racketeers in Legitimate Enterprises, 78 DICK. L. REV.
176 (1973); Note, Racketeers and Non-racketeers Alike Should Fear Florida's RICO Act, 6 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 483 (1978) (comparison of state provision and its federal antecedent) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Fla. RICO].
38. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee suggests that RICO is particularly
addressed to predatory practices of organized crime in otherwise legitimate facets of the econ-
omy. S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76-78 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
Likewise, the debate in the House of Representatives crystalizes this concern. E.g., 116 Cong.
Rec. 35,193 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff, the House sponsor of RICO); id at 35,199 (remarks
of Rep. St. Germain); id at 35,327 (remarks of Rep. Randall). See also McClellan, supra note
37, at 142.
39. United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.W. Va. 1979).
40. Infiltration of Legitimate Business, supra note 37, at 206, 222. The Senate Report,
supra note 38, recognized that the prior remedies were dreadfully inadequate.
Obviously, the time has come for a frontal attack on the subversion of our eco-
nomic system by organized criminal activities. That attack must begin, however with
the frank recognition that our present laws are inadequate to remove criminal influ-
ences from legitimate endeavor organizations. The traditional approach has been to
seek through fine and imprisonment to deter or prevent the perpetration of criminal
behavior. As the efforts of the Federal Government have increased, many of the
Nation's most notorious racketeers have indeed been imprisoned, and many local
organized crime endeavors have been substantially curtailed. Nevertheless, the stark
junctive and other equitable relief,42 treble civil damages,4 3 and se-
vere criminal sanctions. 44 The civil remedy provisions contained in
section 19644' are designed to complement the criminal enforcement
mechanisms.46 On the civil side, Congress looked to the existing
remedies under the antitrust law for guidance. 7 Sections 1964(a)
fact remains: not a single one of the "families" of La Cosa Nostra has been destroyed
through criminal prosecution.
• . . What is needed here, the committee believes, are new approaches that will deal
not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those indi-
viduals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In
short, an attack must be made on the source of economic power itself, and the attack
must take place on all available fronts.
Senate Report, supra note 38, at 78-79. See 84 Stat. 923, reprinted in [1970] 1 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News at 1073: "It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new reme-
dies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."
41. See Enforcing Criminal Laws, supra note 37, at 1063 (characterizing the remedial
measures of RICO as a hybrid).
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(b), 1964(a), (b) (1976).
43. Id § 1964(c).
44. Id § 1963. Section 1963(a) provides for a maximum fine of $25,000 and/or a prison
term not to exceed twenty years. Perhaps the most devastating criminal sanction, however, is
the mandatory forfeiture provision that states the following:
Whoever violates any provision . . . of this chapter . . . shall forfeit to the United
States (I) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and
(2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or contractual right of any kind afford-
ing a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has established, operated,
controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
Id Cf. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1980) (forfeiture provisions are
mandatory not discretionary penalties).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976).
46. In United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1354, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975), the court sustained the government's action seeking divesture and injunctive
relief. The court rejected defendants' argument that section 1964 is a quasi-criminal provision
lacking the requisite procedural safeguards attending such an action. First, Congress has the
inherent power to impose both civil and criminal penalties for the same activities that affect
interstate commerce. Id at 1357. Second, the election to pursue a civil remedy does not
render the proceeding criminal merely because criminal sanctions (that were not sought) were
available. id Section 1964, moreover, was not constitutionally vague since the subject activity
was sufficiently described in the substantive provisions, sections 1961 and 1962, which were
incorporated by the grant of jurisdiction contained in section 1964. Id at 1357-58.
47. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 80-1, states the following:
The committee feels. . . that much can be accomplished here by adopting the civil
remedies developed in the antitrust field to the problem of organized crime ...
Title IX thus brings to bear on the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate
business or other or anizations the full panoply of civil remedies including a civil
investigative deman, now available in the antitrust area. The use of such remedies
as prohibitory injunctions and the issuing of orders of divestment or dissolution is
explicitly authorized. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that these remedies are
not exclusive, and that title IX seeks essentially an economic, not a punitive goal.
In a letter of comment regarding the predecessor to RICO, then Deputy Attorney General
Kleindienst expressed the Justice Department's approval of the civil provisions patterned upon
the anti-trust laws.
While the criminal penalties provided in section 1963 will doubtless have a de-
terrent effect on racketeer infiltration of legitimate business enterprises, the principal
utility of S. 1861 [RICO's predecessor] may well be found to exist in its civil remedies
provisions-injunction, divestiture and dissolution--contained in section 1964, sup-
ported as they are by the broad discovery and procedural devices contained in sec-
tions 1965 through 1968. We have no objection to any of these provisions, and note
that they are substantially identical to existing provisions of the antitrust laws. There
is ample precedent for application of these civil remedies to the conduct sought to be
and (b), which authorize civil actions by the government, are compa-
rable to section 4 of the Sherman Act and section 15 of the Clayton
Act."8  More significantly, the RICO treble damage provision 9 is
virtually identical to another provision of the antitrust laws. 50 Fear-
ing the monopolization of legitimate businesses through illegal activ-
ities, Congress undoubtedly hoped that injured plaintiffs would
vigorously enforce RICO through treble damage actions.51 Experi-
ence has been to the contrary.52
The dearth of RICO civil case law 3 can only be explained by its
inauspicious debut. In the first reported decision, coincidentally
having securities law overtones, the complaint was dismissed be-
cause venue was improper.5 4 That decision was followed by a bla-
tant misconstruction of RICO and its application to defendants who
could not be characterized as members of any organized crime
prohibited by this bill in decisions of the Supreme Court upholding similar civil rem-
edies in antitrust cases ....
Letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to Senator John L. McClellan
(August 11, 1969), reprinted in Senate Report, supra note 38, at 125 [hereinafter cited as Klein-
dienst letter].
Although these materials specifically endorse the antitrust-based civil remedies, they are
silent as to the treble damage provisions that would ultimately be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (1976). Apparently, the treble damage provision was added by the House of Repre-
sentatives. See H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong,, 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 11970] 2 U.S.
Code, Cong. & Ad. News 4007 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. Compare id. at 4034
(House Report section analysis) with Senate Report, supra note 38, at 160 (Senate Report
section analysis). While the Senate Report speaks with clarity on many questions arising
under RICO, the House counterpart is cryptic by comparison.
48. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(a), 1964(b) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) and 15
U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) states:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
51. Organized Crime, supra note 37, at 625. See also Equitable Law Enforcement, supra
note 37, at 509-10.
52. Organized Crime, supra note 37, at 625. See also note 31 supra.
53. See note 31 supra. In a speech directly addressed to the topic, Mr. Gettings quipped
that RICO civil provisions are perhaps the best kept secret in the profession. Address by Brian
P. Gettings, Esq., Temp. L. Q. Symposium on White Collar Crime (Dec. 1, 1979).
54. King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Other than for historical purposes,
this case has little significance for the present inquiry. The case was properly and narrowly
decided on a venue issue. The court does not delineate the factual basis of plaintiffs claim.
Partial explanation can be found in the biography of the notorious financier, recreant corpo-
rate magnate and fugitive from justice, Robert L. Vesco:
To counter Vesco's takeover plans, the ousted chairman of King Resources
Company hired the flamboyant West Coast criminal lawyer Melvin Belli and
brought a "racketeering" suit against the new overlord at lOS and certain of his
associates, alleging that underworld influence and illegal currency manipulations
were being used to force King into personal bankruptcy.
But King soon lost interest in the "racketeering" action against Vesco, since he
was unable to serve him with the requisite legal papers . ...
R. HUTCHISON, VESco at 330-31 (1974). Although Mr. Hutchison correctly notes that service
of process was potentially defective, the court chose to posit its dismissal on the ground of
improper venue under section 1965(a). 342 F. Supp. at 125.
group.55 A number of inappropriate cases have further stunted
RICO's civil growth.56 Still another RICO civil action has been
aborted without opinion.57 Several RICO civil actions have survived
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. 58 Thus, the government has been alone in its as-
sault on organized crime through the provisions of RICO.5 9 But
even the government has sparingly used its civil enforcement powers
under RICO.
III. The Analytical Model of a RICO Civil Action
The object of a RICO civil action is commendable and compre-
hensible in the basest of terms: treble damages are available to any
person injured in his business or property by a violation of the act.6"
Application of RICO, however, is not so simple. It requires the in-
corporation of various short hand concepts 6' into a workable model.
The statutory scheme, moreover, is incomplete since it does not de-
fine the concept of injury,62 the degree of causation,63 or the burden
of proof 64 required to maintain the cause of action. None of these
defects, however, should be an insurmountable barrier to a RICO-
based securities fraud cause of action.65
55. Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also notes 331-41 and
accompanying text infra.
56. See Amanini v. Armstrong Cork Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 63,010 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 12, 1979); Green v. Bartholomew, No. 78-3994 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1979) (motion of
Moorehead); Green v. Bartholomew, No. 78-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1979) (motion of seven
defendants); City of Chicago v. Bilandic, No. 77-4471 (N.D. 111. April 17, 1978).
57. The case stems from a successful criminal prosecution of two gambling junketeers
who utilized a complicated loan scheme and who allegedly withheld the proceeds of gambling
markers to acomplish the take-over of a casino located in the Caribbean. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8,
1974 (New Jersey Pages), at 35. See generally United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). Plaintiffwas the principal prosecution witness in the
related criminal case. Notwithstanding the benefits of estoppel by judgment. Emich Motors
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 569 (1950) (all matters of fact necessarily deter-
mined by a guilty verdict are deemed prima facie proof in a subsequent proceeding), the dock-
et entries show that the pro se plaintiff suffered not only dismissal of his complaint but also a
judgment in excess of $150,000 on a counterclaim. Goberman v. Parness, No. 74-182 (D.N.J.
Motion for summary judgment for B. Parness granted June 1, 1977; order for dismissal as to
M. Parness entered Nov. 10, 1977; consent judgment on counterclaim entered Nov. 28, 1977).
58. See note 33 supra.
59. Organized Crime, supra note 37, at 625. Interestingly, although the government's use
of RICO has increased dramatically in recent years, see Atkinson, supra note 37, at 3 n.21,
only three reported decisions have utilized the civil enforcement powers provided in section
1964. See note 32 supra. For a discussion of the government's civil use of RICO, see Analysis
of RICO, supra note 37; Infiltration of Legitimate Business, supra note 37; Equitable Law En-
forcement, supra note 37; Enforcing Criminal Laws, supra note 37.
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
61. Eg., id § 1961(1) ("racketeering activity); id. § 1961(4) ("enterprises"); id. § 1961(5)
("pattern of racketeering activity").
62. See notes 316-319 and accompanying text infra.
63. See notes 320-325 and accompanying text infra.
64. See notes 350-355 and accompanying text infra.
65. Cf L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 769-87 (1977) (providing broad overview of civil action
for treble damages for violation of antitrust law).
Three elements would appear to be required to sustain a RICO
cause of action: (1) a violation of section 1962, (2) injury or damages
and (3) causation.66 Antitrust law provides analogous support for
this analysis of section 1964(c).67
A4. Violation of Section 1962
As a prerequisite to recovery of treble damages, a plaintiff must
show a violation of section 1962.68 Section 1962, equally applicable
in both civil and criminal contexts,69 contains three substantive
prohibitions and a conspiracy provision. Stripped to its bare essen-
tials,7" the three substantive prohibitions7 require proof of the fol-
lowing six factors: (1) that a person; (2) through a pattern; (3) of
racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt; (4) directly or
indirectly, (a) invests in, or (b) maintains an interest in, or (c) partici-
pates in; (5) an enterprise; (6) the activities of which affect interstate
commerce.
72
1. That a Person. . . Person, for the purposes of RICO, in-
cludes "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or benefi-
cial interest in property. . . ,,73 Thus, any human or juridical
person is capable of violating RICO. Therefore, the broad language
of section 1961(3) would appear to encompass any real or potential
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
67. The cases arising under the antitrust treble damage provision, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976),
support this three step analysis. See, e.g., Response of Car., Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537
F.2d 1307, 1320 (5th Cir. 1976); Perry v. Amerada Hess Corp., 427 F. Supp. 667, 674 (N.D. Ga.
1977) (elements of cause of action are violation of antitrust law, fact of damage causally linked
to violation and some proof of amount of damages); State of Minn. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 299 F.
Supp. 596, 600-01 (D. Minn. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 438 F.2d 1380 (8th Cir. 1971);
Western Theatres v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 41 F. Supp. 757, 763 (D.N.J. 1941).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
69. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976) with 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976).
70. Section 1962 has been called deceptively simple and yet extremely ambiguous. In-
vesting Dirty Money, supra note 37, at 1495. The courts, however, have consistently held the
statute valid in the face of attacks on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague. Eg.,
United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (the statute "may be broad,
but it is not vague.") See generally Atkinson, supra note 37, at 5-6 n.26. Some confusion exists
as to the requisite elements of a section 1962 violation. Compare Investing Dirty Money, supra
note 37, at 1510 (four factors) with United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976) (two
elements). In the civil context, the confusion is compounded because the cases sustaining the
cause of action have eschewed a detailed analysis of section 1962. See note 33 supra.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 19 62(a)-(c) (1976). The enterprise conspiracy provision, section 1964(d),
requires that "an individual, by his words or actions, must have objectively manifested an
agreement to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of an enterprise through the com-
mission oftwo or morepredicate crimes." United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.),
rehearing denied, 575 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (emphasis in origi-
nal). Insofar as the enterprise conspiracy provision overlaps with the substantive provisions,
with the addition of the required agreement, it will not be separately addressed. For a critical
analysis of RICO enterprise conspiracy theory, see RICO Conspiracy, supra note 37.
72. Atkinson, supra note 37, at 2 (footnotes omitted).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976).
defendant in the typical securities fraud case.74
2. Through a Pattern. . "Pattern," a much litigated concept
in the RICO cases, could be problematical as applied in the securi-
ties context. The problem stems from the lack of a definition for the
crucial phrase "pattern of racketeering activity."75 The statute "re-
quires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which oc-
curred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which
occurred within ten years after the commission of a prior act of rack-
eteering activity."76 Upon that much the courts agree.77 Two bones
of contention, however, exist. The first concerns the degree of relat-
edness that must exist between the two predicate acts of racketeering
activity.78 The second addresses the acts of racketeering that are so
closely related as to time, place or mode of commission as to assume
74. See also Blakely & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 350 (citations omitted), which states
the following:
Section 1961(3) provides that "person" includes "any individual or entity capa-
ble of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. As a matter of statutory
construction courts will generally afford "includes" a broader interpretation than the
word "means." This canon of construction is premised on the assumption that "in-
cluding" is not a restrictive term, but one of enlargement. Such an interpretation
conveys the conclusion that items not specifically enumerated may be "included" in
the statute.
Specifically construing RICO, the Ninth Circuit found that the statute was in-
tended to reach individuals and associations as well as organized crime and that there
are no restrictions as to particular persons.
Although accurately characterizing "person" as one of the "building block concepts of
RICO," the concept does not appear to have been litigated as frequently as those authors
would suggest. Indeed, research has revealed no reported case that has specifically decided a
question concerning the definition of "person". A few cases have dealt with the question of the
scope of RICO vis-a-vis defendants who are not a part of what has been historically "orga-
nized crime." The cases, however, indicate only that RICO is not a status offense: to be sub-
ject to the provisions, one must commit the proscribed acts. See, e.g., United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976). But see Barr v.
WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also notes 330-341 and accompanying
text infra.
Perhaps the most cogent authority for a sweeping definition of "person" is section 904(a),
as originally enacted in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, which states that "[tihe
provisions of this title [IX (RICO)] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 947 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1970)).
75. United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), states:
A difficulty is that Section 1961(5) does not define "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity." Rather, it simply states that there can be no proof of a pattern of racketeering
activity that does not include at least two acts of racketeering activity separated by
not more than ten years and with one occurring after the cate of the enactment of the
title.
No such problem was presented to the Ladmer court. See note 77 infra.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
77. See United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (governmental civil
action for equitable relief and divestiture). The government charged defendants with embez-
zling union funds in the course of conducting and attending two union conventions. The court
ruled that the government failed to prove that the first alleged embezzlement constituted rack-
eteering activity. /d at 1241. Therefore, no pattern of racketeering activity existed because
the statute requires two acts of racketeering activity. Id at 1243.
78. See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 575
F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
the unitary appearance of a single criminal episode that is actionable
only if it is continuous.79 The confusion can be traced, in part, to an
improper reading8" of the legislative history."'
The only restriction that the statute imposes is that the prohib-
ited activity82 be conducted "through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity."'8 3 To the extent that each prohibition in section 1962 also
requires the existence of an enterprise, one may reasonably infer that
the alleged racketeering activity must be related to the enterprise.84
79. United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1975) (dicta).
80. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that courts should not resort to
legislative history unless the statute in question is vague or ambiguous. See 2A C. SANDS,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 48.01 (4th ed. 1973). Reliance upon legislative
history, which may itself be vague is a questionable, but nevertheless, frequently employed
practice. Id at §§ 48.02, 48.06. Mr. Justice Jackson was particularly vituperative toward the
indiscriminate use of legislative history when he stated the following:
Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is inescap-
ably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond Committee reports, which
presumably are well considered and carefully prepared. . . . It is the business of
Congress to sum up its own debates in its legislation. Moreover, it is only the words
of the bill that have presidential approval, where that approval is given. It is not to
be supposed that, in signing a bill, the President endorses the whole Congressional
Record.
Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). He added, on another occasion, that he would concur in construction "more readily if
the Court could reach it by analysis of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis of Congress.
That process [gleaning legislative intent] seems to me not interpretation of a statute but crea-
tion of a statute." United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
Nevertheless, courts and commentators have resorted to an analysis of legislative history
even though RICO has uniformily survived all attacks on the grounds of vagueness. See
United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1345 (1980):
United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407
(5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 559 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978);
United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.), afd men., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1015 (1980). Indeed, one of the primary authorities on RICO
specifically referred this author to the legislative history to define the concept of pattern which
he had thretofore stated was not vague. Address of Prof. G. Robert Blakey, Symposium on
White Collar Crime TEMP. L.Q. (Dec. I, 1979). See generally An Analysis ofRICO, supra note
37, at 105-11 (arguing that the statutory definition of pattern is clear and that the resort to
legislative history is improper).
81. See generally Atkinson, supra note 37, at 2, 10-12.
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
83. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962 (1976). "By the definition alone, the term 'pattern'
does not require that there be a relationship between the two acts of racketeering activity.
Nonetheless, the legislative history and judicial construction of the term show that such a
connection is necessary." Atkinson, supra note 37, at 10. Accord, United States v. Stofsky, 409
F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("The third suggested element [the relationship between
predicate acts] is to be found nowhere in the statute itself, either in § 1961 where 'pattern...'
is cast in quantitive terms only or in § 1962 where it is used as an element of the crime
charges.").
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962 (1976).
Three cases also underscore the importance of the racketeering-enterprise relationship. In
United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978), the
court reversed a conviction obtained under a RICO count that charged defendants with oper-
ating an enterprise, a mobile home park, through a pattern of racketeering activity and gam-
bling. Id at 851. The government made no effort to prove that any proceeds were invested in
or channelled into the corporation that owned the mobile home park that merely served as the
situs of the games. Furthermore, no proof was provided that the wages of those who operated
the games, paid out of the gaming revenues, were also for services on behalf of the enterprise.
Thus, the charge failed for want of a connection between the racketeering activity and the
The plain words of the statute, however, impose no further require-
ment that each of the predicate acts of racketeering bear a relation-
ship to one another as well as to the enterprise. The supposed
interrelationship of predicate acts stems from a misreading of the
legislative history of RICO.85 A careful reading of the Senate Re-
port shows that the pattern concept was designed only to exclude
sporadic racketeering activities.86
United States v. Stofsky8 7 first raised the problem of defining the
degree of relatedness necessary to sustain a RICO indictment. De-
fendants were union officers and agents charged with racketeering
88
affairs of the enterprise. Id. at 852. The court suggested that had the government charged
defendants with a different enterprise (i.e., "a group of individuals associated in fact" under
section 1961(4)) a different result would have obtained. Id. Similarly, in United States v.
Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978), the court dismissed the indictment of a General
Motors employee charged with conducting the affairs of an enterprise (GM) through a pattern
of unlawful collection of debts. Relying upon Nerone, the court held that the government
failed to prove a nexus, other than mere employment and situs, between the loan sharking and
the enterprise alleged. Id. at 199. In United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979)
the Fourth Circuit stated that the use of the word "through" in the statute required proof of the
connection between the racketeering activity and the enterprise. Id at 1375. The court re-
jected the RICO conviction because the statute did not proscribe the transfer of an interest in
an enterprise affecting interstate commerce; the transfer was the antitheisis of operating the
enterprise; defendant's role was passive as opposed to managerial; and because the enterprise
was not a front for other racketeering activity. Id at 1376. See also United States v. Gibson,
486 F. Sup. 1230, 1240-44 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (embezzlement of union funds by payment of
personal expenses is not sufficiently connected to union's affairs).
85. The legislative history reveals the following, which is no less cryptic than the statute
itself.
Subsection (5) [of section 1961] defines "pattern of racketeering activity" to re-
quire at least two acts of racketeering activity, as defined above.
The concept of "pattern" is essential to the operations of the statute. One iso-
lated "racketeering activity" was thought insufficient to trigger the remedies provided
under the proposed chapter, largely because the net would be too large and the reme-
dies disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. The target of title IX is thus not
sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than
one "racketeering activity" and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is
this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern.
Senate Report, supra note 38, at 158.
86. Congress intended not to reach solitary or sporadic acts. Id "Racketeering is de-
fined in terms of repeated violations of specfic state andfederal criminal statutes now commonly
violated by members of organized crime." Wilson, supra note 37, at 51 (emphasis added). The
statute, as passed, accomplishes that objective by imposing the limitation that a " 'pattern of
racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity .. " 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (1976). The statute nowhere states that there must be a relationship between the
predicate acts. The legislative history says that there must be a relationship but does not iden-
tify what must be related and how. The requirement of a relationship between predicate acts
has been added as a judicial gloss. See, e.g., United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). Such reliance upon equivocable legislative history is blatantly improper even
if the court first finds that the statute is vague or ambiguous. See 2A C. SANDS, supra note 84,
at §§ 48.01, 48.02, 48.06. In no case has a court so held. See An Analvsis ofRICO, supra note
37, at 105-11.
87. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
88. Each indictment, in a series of substantive counts, charges independent federal
crimes. These substantive crimes, which are also "racketeering activities" as defined
in § 1961(1)(B) or (C), are then incorporated as predicate offenses in yet another
substantive count in each indictment charging that certain of the defendants named
therein conducted or participated in the affairs of the union through a pattern of
racketeering activity, as proscribed in § 1962(c).
Id at 611.
and accepting payments from employers in violation of the labor
laws.8 9 Defendants' multifarious motion to dismiss attacked section
1962(c) 9' on the grounds of vagueness. The court rejected the argu-
ment because the statute, on its face, "set forth . . .[the] necessary
connection between the person who would commit the enumerated
predicate acts and the enterprise, and between the acts and that per-
son's participation in the operations of the enterprise."'" The court,
concurring with the government's analysis, added the further gloss
"that the word 'pattern' should be construed as requiring more than
accidental or unrelated instances of proscribed behavior. ' 92 The
court reasoned that "pattern of racketeering activity" as defined in
section 1961(5) should be construed in pari materia93 with another
provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 that defined
"pattern of criminal conduct" as conduct that "embraces criminal
acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, vic-
tims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by dis-
tinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."94 The court
further noted that such a limiting construction was necessary to
avoid the potentiality of severe sanctions imposed for the commis-
sion of two misdemeanors over a ten year period and upon the proof
that the misdemeanors were committed in the course of employ-
ment.95 The court concluded that the statutory scheme included a
requirement that the individual racketeering acts must be connected
to each other by a common scheme or motive.96 Thus, to satisfy
Stofsky, one would have to show that the two predicate acts have a
relationship to one another and that, taken together, the pattern of
racketeering activity is related to the enterprise. 97 United States v.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 186(b) (1976).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
91. 409 F. Supp. at 613. Accord United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015-16
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (following Sto/ksy), appeal dismissed mem. 556 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977).
92. 409 F. Supp. at 613. The government had suggested that the statutory relationship
could be characterized as requiring: (1) the commission of two or more predicate acts; (2) that
the acts were performed in the course of employment by the enterprise; and (3) that the acts
were connected by a common plan or scheme. No indication was given whether the govern-
ment's statement of position was in the conjunctive or in the alternative. Id
. 93. 409 F. Supp. at 614. But see An Analysis of RICO, supra note 37, at 106-07 (statute
not vague; in pari materia improperly applied).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1976). This provision is not a part of RICO, but was passed as a
part of a separate title of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, which deals with sentenc-
ing of special offenders. See also note 93 supra.
95. 409 F. Supp. at 614.
96. Yet, the entire statutory scheme indicates that if these acts were isolated and
unrelated they do not add up to the kind of activity Congress meant to describe when
it used the word "pattern." This court therefore construes the word "pattern" as
including a requirement that the racketeering acts must have been connected with
each other by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern and
not simply a series of disconnected acts.
Id
97. Graphically, the Sio/ksy rule would resemble a "T". The top cross-bar, imposed by
White, 9 8 is likewise cited in support of this rationale. The White
court denied a motion to dismiss an indictment on the grounds of
vagueness. 99 Defendant's predicate acts were mail fraud"° and in-
terstate transportation of stolen property.'°l Although the case is si-
lent with regards to how each related to the other, the court
nevertheless found that because the predicate acts were part of a
continuing criminal activity, the relatedness test of Stofsky was
met. 102
More recently, the Fifth Circuit espoused a different viewpoint.
In United States v. Elliot,10 3 the court was confronted with a diversi-
fied criminal combine whose activities included arson, automobile
theft, stealing construction equipment, thefts from shipments in in-
terstate commerce, sales of stolen property, sales of narcotics and
contract murders."° The prosecution, admittedly seeking a broader
application of RICO than had been previously entertained, 0 5 con-
tended that this wholly illegitimate group of individuals, associated
in fact, constituted an enterprise the affairs of which were conducted
through a pattern of racketeering activity.'0 6 Defendants argued,
however, that the predicate acts had no relationship to one an-
other 1 7 and that wholly illegitimate ventures were beyond the reach
Stojksy, links the two predicate acts. The pillar, imposed by the language of section 1962(a)-
(c), connects the predicate acts to the enterprise. See also note 84 supra.
98. 386 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
99. Id at 883.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
101. Id. § 2314.
102. 386 F. Supp. at 883-84 states the following:
I conclude that the defendant's position is without merit. In common usage, the
term "pattern" is applied to a combination of qualities or acts forming a consistent or
characteristic arrangement. Use of the term "pattern" in connection with two racke-
teering acts committed by the same person suggests that the two must have a greater
interrelationship than simply commission by a common perpetrator. The acts alleged
in count I are part of a particular continuing criminal activity.
In my judgment, there is implicit in the statutory definition of "pattern or racke-
teering activity" a requirement that the government must prove such a interrelated-
ness beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a conviction under § 1962(c). No
claim is made that only organized crime figures commit the various crimes which are
designated at § 1961 as "racketeering activity." Absent a showing of a "pattern" or
interrelatedness of such activity, § 1962(c) could be used against the isolated acts of
an independent criminal, such was not the intended target of the challenged statute.
Accord, United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.) (following Wfhite; sustaining indictment
on grounds that defendant's continuous and related acts of accepting payments as a union
steward from employees for services that were never performed constituted a pattern of racke-
teering activity), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977). See also 2 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §§ 56.20, 56.23 (1979 Supp).
103. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 575 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978).
104. Id at 897-99 (drawing an analogy between the criminal enterprise and a legitimate
corporate entity).
105. Id at 884.
106. Id at 884, 897. The government's theory was founded upon section 1962(c) and the
conspiracy provision, section 1962(d).
107. Id at 884. The court employed a metaphor to describe the contentions of the parties.
The government admits that in this prosectution it has attempted to achieve a
broader application of RICO than has heretofore been sanctioned. Predictably, the
of the statute. 18 The court reasoned that
a single enterprise engaged in diversified activities fits comfortably
within the proscriptions of the statute and the dictates of common
sense . . . [because] [wie would deny society the protection in-
tended by Congress were we to hold that the Act does not reach
those enterprises nefarious enough to diversity their criminal ac-
tivity. 109
The court, rejecting an argument based upon White and Stofsky, lO
reasoned that the statute, on its face, imposed no requirement of in-
terrelatedness and that no reason existed to read one into the defini-
tion of pattern of racketeering activity provided in section 1961(5)." '1
Moreover, no constitutional prohibition prevented Congress from
making a special definition of "pattern" to entail the commission of
two acts in a given time span regardless of whether the two acts
amount to a pattern as that term is ordinarily understood." 2 The
court concluded that no interrelationship had to be established be-
tween the predicate acts.
The gravamen of the offense . . . is the conduct of an enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Thus, the Act
does require a type of relatedness: the two or more predicate
crimes must be related to the affairs of the enterprise but need not
otherwise be related to each other."
3
Thus, to satisfy Elliot, it must be shown that two separate acts of
racketeering activity occurred and that each had an independent re-
lationship to the affected enterprise.'' 4
The cases after Elliot have been consistent with its teachings. "15
government and the defendants differ as to what this case is about. According to the
defendants, what we are dealing with is a leg, a tail, a trunk, an ear-separate entities
unaffected by RICO proscriptions. The government, on the other hand, asserts that
we have come eyeball to eyeball with a single creature of behemouth proportions,
securely within RICO's grasp. After a careful, if laborious study of the facts and the
law, we accept, with minor exceptions, the government's view ....
Id.
108. The court rejected this contention. Id. at 897-98. See also notes 248-292 and accom-
panying text infra.
109. 1d. at 899.
110. Id at 899 n.23.
111. Id.
112. Id (quoting United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aj7'd
mem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978)).
113. Id
114. Graphically, the Elliott rule would resemble a "V". The confluence would be the
enterprise. Each predicate act would be vectorially connected to the enterprise. Elliott would
not require the prosecutor or plaintiff to triangulate by proving that the predicate acts are
connected to one another. But see notes 91-102 and accompanying text supra.
115. Most subsequent cases have decided whether the alleged conduct constituted a pat-
tern of racketeering activity solely on the basis of the minimum of two predicate acts and a
related enterprise without discussion of the question of the degree of relationship among them.
See, e.g., United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1980) (committing two acts consti-
tutes a pattern); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1979) ("A pattern may be
established by showing only two acts of racketeering activity."), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614
(March 25, 1980), United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48
U.S.L.W. 3602 (March 18, 1980); United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1067 (3d Cir.) (three
acts of receiving bribes sufficient to constitute a pattern), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978). But
For example, in United States P. Thevis, 116 defendants were charged
as a group of individuals associated in fact with various corporations
to operate a pornography business through a pattern of racketeering
activity.' '" After noting the split authority on the question of relat-
edness, the court was constrained to follow the Elliott rationale." ,8
In United States v. De Palma, "9 the Southern District of New York
voluntarily embraced the Elliott rationale. 2 ° Defendants were
charged with skimming the assets 12 1 of a corporation through a pat-
tern of securities frauds, a bankruptcy fraud and an obstruction of
justice.'22 The court first noted that section 1961(5) is "unambiguous
and contains no reference to any requirement of 'relatedness.' 123
Furthermore, the court reasoned that, the legislative history 24 re-
vealed only that Congress was concerned with the number of racke-
teering activities that would constitute a pattern of racketeering
activity and that the activity be related to the affairs of the same
enterprise.' 25 The court paid particular note to an amendment to
section 1961(5) that changed the definitional requirement from one
to two acts of racketeering activity.' 26 The court also inferred from
cf United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601 n.2 (7th Cir. 1978) (suggesting that to
avoid constitutional vagueness challenges, "pattern" requires that the predicate acts be con-
nected by a common motive).
A pre-Ellioti commentator, who was more liberal in his analysis of RICO, stated the fol-
lowing:
In order for criminal acts to constitute a "pattern," Title IX clearly requires only
that two racketeering acts be committed within a period of ten years. It is improper
to infer from other statutes that the acts must bear some similarity to each other. In
addition, the pattern need not bear a certain degree of proximity to the essential
functions of the corrupt business. . . . There is no reason to assume that only certain
types of corruption are prohibited.
An Analysis of RICO, supra note 37, at I11.
116. 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
117. Although the court mentions that defendants were engaged in conducting the affairs
of a pornography business, in ruling on the notice to dismiss, it does not state what the predi-
cate acts were. Id at 136-37, 140. Pornography is not a racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1) (1976). The companion case, United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 117, 125 (N.D.
Ga. 1979) (on motion for a bill of particulars), reveals that the means employed were murder,
arson, extortion, obstruction of justice and mail fraud, all of which fall within the section
196 1(1) definition of racketeering activity.
118. There is a dispute among the circuits as to whether the predicate acts in the
"pattern of racketeering activity" must have an interdependence among themselves.
This Court, of course, pays allegiance to the views of the Fifth Circuit, and notes that
under its interpretation, no interrelation among the predicate acts themselves is re-
quired other than the requisite nexus to the affairs of the enterprises.
474 F. Supp. at 139 n.7 (citations omitted).
119. 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
120. Id at 782-84.
121. Id at 785.
122. Id. at 781.
123. Id at 782.
124. See note 76 supra.
125. 461 F. Supp. at 782.
126. Two significant amendments to the definition of pattern of racketeering, prior
to the enactment of the statute, lend further support to this view. Prior to these
amendments the definition was as follows: "The term pattern of racketeering activity
includes at least one act occurring after the effective date of this chapter." Since "the
term 'pattern' indicates that what is intended to be proscribed is not a single isolated
the legislative silence that had Congress desired to further limit the
concept of pattern by imposing a requirement of relatedness, it could
have done so. 127  Indeed, one state statute based upon RICO has
done precisely that. 128 But the Congress did no more than impose
the requirement that one commit two acts of racketeering and that
those acts be connected to some enterprise.' 29 Thus, a recent com-
mentator has concluded that the Elliott rationale is correct since
"[t]he notion that two predicate crimes can be related by reference to
a common, enterprise is consistent with the legislative history, which
defines 'pattern' as not 'isolated.' ""3"
The second problem arises in those cases in which two or more
predicate acts are committed in the course of a single criminal epi-
sode. 13' The argument rests solely upon one court's gratuitous refer-
ence to legislative history. In United States v. Moeller, 132 defendants
were charged with conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity consisting of arson and kidnapping.
Defendants had set out only to destroy one building and did, in fact,
accomplish that objective.' 33 The kidnapping charge related to three
act of 'racketeering activity,' but at least two such acts" the statute was amended to
read as follows: "the term 'pattern of racketeering activity' means at least two acts,
one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter." There was no require-
ment that the two acts be related to each other. In fact, at that point there was no
requirement that the two acts even be related in time. This was the cause of some
concern to those who commented on the proposed bill. Such concerns led to the
enactment of the ten year limitation in the statute. It was this ten year limitation that
provided any requirement of nexus between the two predicate acts. In its final form
the statute simply required that the person commit at least two acts of racketeering
activity within a ten year period.
Id (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1121-23 (2d Cir.
1980).
127. Considering the time and effort spent by Congress on this definition, had it
wanted to provide for any "relatedness," it had ample opportunity to do so. Instead
Congress must have realized that the definition of "pattern of racketeering activity"
would necessarily be interpreted in the context of the statute to which it applies (18
U.S.C. § 1962). Thus, the term "pattern," when used in this context, applies to the
relationship of the acts to the enterprise, and no more. The definition of "racketeer-
ing activity," taken together, results in the conclusion that the "pattern" definition
states a minimum but not necessarily an exclusive definition. A main focus of Title
IX was the enterprise, not only the persons committing the acts and the Congress felt
that the pattern would be supplied by this common factor.
Id at 782-83 (footnotes omitted).
128. FLA. STAT. § 943.461(4) (1977) provides that "[p]attern of racketeering activity means
engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents,
results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by dis-
tinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents ...." But see 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 91 l(h)(4) (Purdon 1978) (" 'pattern of racketeering activity' refers to a course of conduct
requiring two or more acts of racketeering activity ..."). Two states have eliminated the
concept of a pattern of racketeering activity from their RICO-based statutes. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. §§ 13-2301, subsec. D., par. 4, 13-2312, 13-2314 (Supp. 1978 Special Pamphlet); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 7-15-1(a), 7-15-2, 7-15-4 (Supp. 1979). Therefore, in Arizona and Rhode Is-
land, one can recover treble damages for a single act of racketeering activity.
129. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962 (1976).
130. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 355 (footnote omitted).
131. United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
132. Id
133. Id at 57.
employees of the plant that was destroyed. 34 Although concluding
that a pattern of racketeering activity had been established,' 35 the
court further expressed its disfavor with the statutory scheme.' 36 To
the Moeller court, "the common sense interpretation of the word
'pattern' implies acts occurring in different criminal episodes, episodes
that are at least somewhat separated in time and place yet still suffi-
ciently related by purpose to demonstrate a continuity of activity." 1
37
Its sole authority for that proposition was the Senate Report. 38
Subsequent cases have grappled with the problem' 39 but have
uniformly rejected the contention of the Moeller court. 4 ° A single
scheme that resulted in six incidents of wire fraud directed at the
same victim over a four week period was held to be a pattern of
racketeering activity.' 4 ' A single mail fraud scheme that included
several separate mailings constituted a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.' 42 A common modus operandi will suffice. 143  Mere unity of
134. Id Although the facts supporting the kidnapping allegation are not fully developed,
it is apparent that both the prosecution and the court regarded the kidnapping of the three
guards as a single act.
135. Id at 58. The court grudgingly followed the rule set down in United States v. Par-
ness, 503 F.2d 430, 438 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1997) by stating that "[a]
'pattern' can apparently be established in this Circuit by two acts and occurring on the same
day in the same place and forming part of the same criminal episode." 402 F. Supp. at 58.
136. 402 F. Supp. at 57-58.
137. ld at 57 (emphasis in original).
138. Id at 58 (citing Senate Report, supra note 38, at 158). But see note 80 supra.
139. E.g., United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa.), ajffdmem., 588 F.2d 822
(3d Cir. 1978). The racketeering count was based upon the receipt of a $27,500 bribe in con-
nection with the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority. The single scheme was bribery. Sev-
eral mailings, which were the basis of mail fraud counts, completed the pattern of racketeering
activity.
There can be little doubt that the evidence brings this case within the literal lan-
gauge of the statute. A "pattern" is defined as two or more acts of racketeering activ-
ity, and "racketeering" is defined to include both the bribery and the mail fraud. The
jury was instructed that they must acquit the defendant on the RICO charge unless
they concluded that he did receive the $27,500 bribe, and also was guilty of at least
one count of mail fraud. It is clear that all of the mailings which gave rise to the mail
fraud were in connection with the single scheme to obtain the $27,500 bribe. But it is
equally clear that each act of mailing constitutes a separate offense, even though re-
lated to the same scheme to defraud. If this is so, there would seem to be no obstacle
to treating each as a separate act of racketeering for the purpose of the RICO statute.
While the question is a close one, I have concluded that a single, ongoing scheme to
defraud by obtaining bribes or kickbacks, which involves a series of unlawful acts, can
establish a 'Pattern "for the purposes of RICO, and that it is not necessary to establish
two or more totally independent criminal acts.
Id at 200 (emphasis added). Accord, United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02
(7th Cir. 1978) (seven acts of mail fraud committed in the furtherance of one scheme to de-
fraud the Veteran's Administration constituted a pattern).
140. See Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 354-55 & nn.!21-25.
141. United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
142. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978).
143. United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1976). The court held that several
rigged card games over a nineteen month period were not such sporadic activity that the Sen-
ate Report would place beyond the reach of the statute. A recognizable pattern was present in
that each consisted of junkets to Nevada, games conducted in the hotel suite of defendants,
and the same mode of commission (use of shills, cold deck and slight of hand tricks). Cf.
United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979) (three home robberies committed over a
period of fourteen months by the same principals who met and planned each at the same
time'44 and purpose' 45 will not defeat the finding of a pattern of
racketeering activity. The common thread that runs through each of
these patterns is that the predicate acts are separately indictable. 1
46
Each of the separate predicate offenses charged required proof of a
different fact not necessarily a part of the proof of the other predicate
acts. 14 ' A similar rationale has been applied to defeat claims of
double jeopardy' 48 and multiplicity.' 49 Thus, even though tempo-
rally related, predicate acts that are separately indictable will consti-
tute a pattern of racketeering activity, provided they related to an
enterprise.
Both the Stofsky/Elliott and Moeller problems are presented in
defining the pattern of racketeering activity for the purposes of a
RICO-based securities fraud cause of action. Few RICO cases have
also concerned securities claims. 5 ° Regrettably, no one case probes
the precedent and states an appropriate standard for a RICO civil
action.
United States v. De Palma "' comes close to defining "pattern"
for the purposes of a RICO securities case. De Palma concerned a
emporium constituted a pattern), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (March 25, 1980): United
States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 193 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (four acts of accepting bribes to
influence admissions to graduate school committed over a two and a half year period were not
insufficient as a matter of law).
144. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 438 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1105
(1975), concerned two acts of interstate transportation of stolen property and one act of inter-
state travel in the furtherance of a scheme to defraud. Although these three acts spanned a five
day period, they were part of a larger scheme whose single purpose was the take-over of a
resort casino. Cf. United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58 (D. Conn. 1975) (arson and
kidnapping on same day as part of same plan to burn one building constitutes a pattern).
145. See United States v. DeFrancesco, 604 F.2d 269, (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S.
Ct. 1012 (1980); United States v. Hansen, 583 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912
(1978): United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979);
United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Burnsed, 566 F.2d
882 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d
1064 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 562 F.2d 1257, 1258 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S.
1020 (1978).
146. E.g., United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978).
147. Id Accord, United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788, 794 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
148. United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
677 (1980): United States v. Maletesta, 583 F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Smith, 574 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1978) (panel), modifled 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), (en banc)
(addressing evidentiary issue only), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 91 (1979);
United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087-88 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978): United States v. Meinster, 475 F. Supp. 1093 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
149. United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788, 800-01 (M.D. Pa. 1978); United States v.
Hansen, 422 F. Supp. 430, 433 (E.D. Wis. 1976); United States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 549
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
150. United States v. De Palma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (referring to "securities
fraud" without specificity); Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278
(D. Del. 1978) (5(a), 5(c), 12 and 17(a) of the 1933 Act; 10(b) and 20(a) of the 1934 Act and
rule lOb-5); United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (10(b) of the 1934 Act and
rule lOb-5); Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., No. 76-122 (D. Del. April 25, 1978).
Cf. Parties v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. 1. 1980) (commodities
fraud).
151. 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See a/so United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118
(2d Cir. 1980).
motion to dismiss an indictment that charged ten counts of securities
fraud'52 and bankruptcy fraud. Apparently, defendants had formed
a corporation that operated a movie theater, sold shares of its stock
to raise funds for the corporation, skimmed off the assets and then
threw the corporation into bankruptcy.'53 The court characterized
the securities fraud as one predicate act 54 and the bankruptcy fraud
as the other.'55 The court specifically embraced the Elliott rationale:
that neither predicate act must be related to the other so long as both
are related to the enterprise.5 6 The strength of the De Palma hold-
ing is questionable, however, in light of its alternate holding that
Sofsky would also be satisfied because the case was comprised of
the same actors; both frauds related to the same enterprise; the same
individuals were victimized twice, once by securities fraud, once by
bankruptcy fraud; both frauds shared a common goal; both were
committed within the statutory ten year period; and the skimming
activity, though not a predicate act of itself, created the inference of
a nexus between the two frauds. 15
The lone civil case entailing the interplay between RICO and
the federal securities laws can be read consistently with De Palma
and Elliott. In Farmers Bank of Delaware v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 158
plaintiff stated a claim under the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act and RICO.
Plaintiff alleged that it had been defrauded as the result of the
purchase of approximately forty-six forged mortgages from defend-
ants. 59 Although the case consisted of the same mode of commis-
sion, the same fraudulent scheme, the same victim, the same goals
and the same perpetrators, 61 the court held that the pattern of
racketeering activity had been sufficiently alleged because a suffi-
cient number of racketeering acts were set forth in the complaint. 161
Another instructive case is United States v. Pray. 162 Pray con-
152. The specific provisions allegedly violated were not identified by the court.
153. 461 F. Supp. at 785.
154. It would also have been possible to treat each fraudulent sale as a separate predicate
act for the purposes of RICO even though only one fraudulent scheme existed. Cf. Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (since seventeen purchase confirmations were received,
seventeen counts were alleged); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir.
1978) (each particular fraudulent mailing would have been a separately indictable offense).
See also Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., No. 76-122 (D. Del. April 25, 1978).
155. 461 F. Supp. at 783 n.6, 785.
156. 1d. at 782-83. See also notes 103-130 and accompanying text supra.
157. Id at 785.
158. 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1279 (D. Del. 1978) (citing prior unreported opinion as basis for
denying instant motion).
159. Plaintiffs complaint at 8, 61, 73h, Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp.,
452 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978).
160. Cf. United States v. De Palma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States
v. White, 386 F. Supp. 883, 883-84 (E.D. Wis. 1974); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp.
609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
161. Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., No. 76-122, slip op. at 7-8 (D. Del.
April 25, 1978). See also Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
162. 452 F. Supp. 788 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
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cerned a broker-dealer who used his position to engage in a pattern
of fraudulent conduct through which he converted money that he
obtained from his customers. The customers gave defendant money
that he had agreed to invest for them. From time to time, defendant
mailed "dividend checks" and lulling letters that concealed the fact
of his conversions. Additionally, defendant liquidated two custom-
ers' holdings without permission, converted the proceeds and con-
cealed the transactions from those concerned. The predicate acts
alleged were violations of rule lOb-5 and mail fraud. 163 Defendant
moved to dismiss on the grounds of multiplicity. The court sus-
tained the motion only as it related to one count of mail fraud.'
The court noted that securities fraud required proof of a scheme to
defraud, the purchase or sale of a security and the mailing of the
letter to meet the jurisdictional basis. The court further noted that
mail fraud required the same fraudulent scheme and the use of the
mails to execute the scheme. 65 Insofar as both counts relied upon
the same specific mailing, however, the mail fraud count was sub-
sumed by the securities fraud count and was, therefore, dismissed. 1
66
Pray can be reconciled with those cases that have allowed securities
fraud and mail fraud to stand, side by side, in the same indictment
because Pray required the mailing to complete both frauds whereas
other cases have reasoned that the mail fraud was complete before
the securities fraud was concluded.
67
163. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). Mail fraud is made actionable under RICO through 18
U.S.C. § 1961(i)(B) (1976).
164. 452 F. Supp. at 800.
165. Id Cf. United States v. Van Allen, 28 F.R.D. 329, 342-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Defend-
ant was charged with conspiracy and thirty substantive violations: eight counts of violating
section 5(c) of the 1933 Act for offering to sell unregistered securities by mail; five counts under
section 5(a)(2) of the 1933 Act for delivery of unregistered securities through the mails; twelve
counts under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act for using the mails to defraud in the offer and sales
of securities; and five counts of mail fraud. The court held that each stated a separate substan-
tive crime because each required the proof of a different element. Id at 342. The court ex-
pressly rejected defendant's contention that the government could not divide up the course of
conduct into its component parts. Id at 343.
166. 452 F. Supp. at 800. Cf. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (sale
of narcotics). But cf. Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473, 483-84 & n.16 (1941) (Congress
did not intend to repeal the mail fraud statute by implication when it enacted the 1933 Act);
United States v. Alluan, 13 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Tex. 1936) (1933 Act and mail fraud provision
have different objectives, therefore indictment charging both is not defective).
167. In United States v. Alluan, 13 F. Supp. 289, 290 (N.D. Tex. 1936), defendants had
engaged in an extensive promotion of the stock of a mining company soon to be formed.
Defendants made numerous misrepresentations through the mailing of personal correspon-
dence, circular letters and pamphlets; and by use of the radio, telegram and oral representa-
tions. The court held that the indictment should not be dismissed. Id at 292.
The acts are catalogued, however, in various prohibitions. The offense charged in
these particular indictments was the formation of a scheme or artifice to defraud
which was to be effected, to some degree, by the use of the mails. That scheme was
the alleged development of a worthless mine and the issuance of stocks thereon, and
the agreeing together of men to carry forward such offense, and then finally the ac-
tual sale of such stocks by misstatements through the United States mails. Thefraud-
ulent use of the mail was a completed offense before any securities were sold The
violation of the Securities Act was not completed until the sale actually took place. The
Although it never specifically addresses the issue, Pray suggests
the ultimate limit as to what constitutes a pattern of racketeering
activity for the purposes of a RICO-based securities cause of action.
Since securities fraud requires a scheme to defraud, the purchase or
sale of a security and a connection to interstate commerce, a real
potential exists for overlapping mail fraud' 6 8 or wire fraud.'69 The
latter frauds similarly require a scheme to defraud and a particular
connection to interstate commerce; mail fraud requires use of the
mails to execute the scheme, while wire fraud entails the use of wire,
radio or television. 70 If the securities fraud jurisdictional element is
satisfied by some connection to interstate commerce other than the
mere mailing or wire that simultaneously serves as the basis of the
respective mail or wire fraud, then separately indictable iffenses
have been stated. 171 If, however, both frauds rely upon the same
letter or wire, then only one indictable offense exists and, conse-
quently, no pattern of racketeering activity can be found. Therefore,
a pattern of racketeering activity can be established in the securities
context even though only one victim has been defrauded by one per-
petrator through one scheme to defraud that consisted of only one
sale of a single security. 7 2 Such a construction of "pattern of racke-
teering activity" is consistent with the liberal principles that have
emerged in the cases'73 and that inhere in the statute. 
74
3. OfRackeeeringActivity. . . RICO encompasses "fraud in
the sale of securities . . . . "7 This is accomplished through the
definition of another RICO concept: "racketeering activity."' 76 Sec-
tion 1961 was designed to adopt, by generic reference, 77 those of-
two statutes, therefore, operate upon diflerent portions of the same act, or the same
fraud the first for the punishment of the fraud itself, and the secondfor the sale of the
fruit ofthefraud Thefirst is complete without a sale; the second requires it. And this is
true even though "'sale" includes some transactions not ordinarily understood as sales.
Id at 292 (emphasis added). Accord, United States v. Van Allen, 28 F.R.D. 329, 342-44
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
169. Id § 1343 (1976).
170. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) with 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
171. See United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788, 800 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
172. See notes 130-148 and accompanying text supra. Accord, United States v. Van Allen,
28 F.R.D. 329, 342-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Alluan, 13 F. Supp. 289, 292 (N.D.
Tex. 1936).
173. "Probably no single text will evolve to determine the presence of the necessary inter-
relationship between acts of racketeering activity." Atkinson, supra note 37, at I!.
174. RICO, a comprehensive statute designed to attack organized crime at the source of its
power, is coupled with an express congressional mandate that it be liberally construed to effec-
tuate its remedial purposes. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 909(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1976)).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(i)(D) (1976).
176. Id § 1961(1). See also Investing Dirty Money, supra note 37, at 1493.
177. United States v. Maletesta, 583 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978) (panel), modified 590 F.2d
1379 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (evidentiary issue), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
fenses often used by organized crime to gain economic advantage. 78
Clearly Congress perceived certain securities violations to be among
those offenses commonly committed by organized crime. Section
1961(1) specifically states: "'Racketeering activity' means . . . (D)
any offense involving. . . fraud in the sale of securities. . . punish-
able under any law of the United States . . . ." ' Congress has,
however, left undefined the specific term - "fraud in the sale of
securities." Additionally, no cross references to the federal securities
laws have been provided to aid in the identification of proscribed
conduct as had been done with othr predicate crimes.' Thus, to
maintain a RICO-based securities case, one must first determine
what securities violations will satisfy the requirement of racketeering
activity. "'
Section 1961(l)(D) identifies three keys to a determination of
the statute's scope: (1) fraud; (2) the sale of a security; and (3) that
the fraudulent sale of a security be punishable under any law of the
United States. 8 2 Numerous provisions would fall within this test.
First, the proscription of fraudulent conduct pervades the federal se-
curities laws. 8 3 Certainly the most frequently litigated provisions,
91 (1979); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1072 (1978); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aj'dmem., 578
F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). See also Senate Report, supra note
38, at 122 (Kleindienst Letter).
178. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1050 (1976); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1019 (D. Md. 1976).
The Senate Report, supra note 38, at 158, provides the following:
Subsection (1) [of section 1961] defines "racketeering activity" to include those
crimes most often associated with the infiltration of legitimate organizations. Those
crimes are murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, narcotic
violations, counterfeiting, usury, mail, bankruptcy, wire and securities fraud, and ob-
struction of justice. The state offenses are included by generic designation ...
Senator McClellan illumined the congressional intent of this definitional scheme in refutation
of an overbreadth attack.
The bar committee complains that the list is too inclusive, since it includes offenses
which often are committed by persons not engaged in organized crime. The Senate
report does not claim, however, that the listed offenses are committed primarily by
members of organized crime. The listed offenses lend themselves to organized com-
mercial exploitation, unlike some other offenses such as rape, and experience has
shown they are commonly committed by participants in organized crime. That is all
the title IX list of offenses purports to be, that is all the Senate report claims it to be,
and that is all it should be.
McClellan, supra note 37, at 142-43 (footnotes omitted). One court has held that such a defini-
tional nature of section 1961(1) was necessary to overcome the potential ambiguity inherent in
the phrase "racketeering activity." United States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1976).
180. Compare id. with id. § 196 1(1)(B) (providing cross references from specific code sec-
tions to the generic category by way of parenthetical).
181. "The term 'racketeering activity' is a key statutory term. Under proposed section
1962 the racketeering activity is one of three prerequissites to commision of an offense. Ifthere
is no racketeering activity, there can be no violation of thepro visions of this title. " Senate Report,
supra note 38, at 158 (emphasis added).
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1976).
183. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963).
While precise and inflexible parameters cannot be established due to the variety of forms that
the general antifraud measures, 184 will qualify under RICO. Addi-
tionally, certain other provisions that merely make unlawful certain
types of conduct can be swept up by the antifraud measures.' 85
Thus, any violation of the federal securities laws other than the re-
porting or so-called housekeeping measures should suffice. 18 6 Sec-
ond, the concept of the sale of a security is broadly defined under the
federal securities laws to include portfolio liquidations, mergers,
tendcr offers, and squeeze outs as well as traditional sales in which
ownership of beneficial interest shifts from one to another.' 87 Thus,
no "sale" problem should arise in a RICO securities case. 88 Finally,
the federal securities laws contain blanket criminal sanctions for
nearly every violation of a substantive provision.' 89 The three RICO
cases concerning securities issues are, by their silence, consistent with
this interpretation because each consisted of fraudulent conduct, the
sale of securities, and potential criminal sanctions for the alleged vi-
olations. 190
This construction is also consistent with the construction given
to the state offenses generically listed in section 1961(1)(A). In
United States v. Forsythe, "9' the court considered the incorporation
the fraudulent conduct may take, the ALl Code provides a manageable collection of that con-
duct generally regarded as fraudulent. See ALl Code, supra note 4, at §§ 1602-1614. See
generally Note, The Securities and Exchange Commission.- .4n Introduction to the Enforcement
of the Criminal Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1979).
184. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act; sections 10(b) and 15(c) of the 1934 Act; and rules lOb-
5 and 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.15cl-2 are regarded as the core of the antifraud
measures. The ALl Code thus summarizes these measures and others:
[Purchases, sales, proxy solicitations, tender offers, and investment advice. ] (a) [Gen-
eral.] It is unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudulent act or to make a misrep-
resentation in connection with (1) a sale or purchase of a security, an offer to sell or
buy a security, or an inducement not to buy or sell a security, (2) a proxy solicitation
or other circularization of security holders in respect of a security of a registrant, (3) a
tender offer or a recommendation to security holders in favor of or in opposition to a
tender offer, or (4) activity or proposed activity as an investment advisor.
ALl Code, supra note 4, at § 1602(a).
185. Eg., Sections 5, 6-10, 11, 12 of the 1933 Act; sections 5, 9, 13, 14, 16, and 18 of the
1934 Act; sections 36 and 37 of ICA: and sections 206 and 208 of IAA.
186. See also Fla. RICO, supra note 37.
187. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 6, at 994-1004.
188. No RICO civil case should flounder for want of a "sale of security" in the technical
sense. Even if no security or no sale exists, as the terms are defined in the federal securities
laws, the cause of action will nevertheless survive so long as one can prove a scheme to defraud
and the use of the mail or the wire in execution thereof. Section 196 1(l)(B) makes mail fraud
and wire fraud actionable as racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B) (1976). Cf. Parries
v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Il. 1980). (RICO civil action based on
mail fraud) (potato futures).
189. See section 24 of the 1933 Act; section 32(a) of the 1934 Act; section 29 of PUHC;
section 325 of TIA; section 49 of ICA; and section 217 of IAA. Accord, ALI Code, supra note
4, at § 1821(3).
190. See Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978)
(sections 5, 12 and 17 of the 1933 Act; 10(b) and 20(a) of the 1934 Act); United States v. Pray,
452 F. Supp. 788 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (section 10(b) of the 1934 Act). United States v. De Palma,
461 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), also concerned securities fraud, but the specific violations
are not stated in the opinion. None of these cases goes beyond the language of the statute for
support.
191. 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977), rev'g, 429 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
of state bribery violations into the federal racketeering statute. The
specific question presented was the definition of the phrase "any act
. . . involving. . . bribery which is chargeable under state law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. . ... 192 The
conflict arose because the state statute of limitations had run but the
federal limitations had not. The court held that the longer federal
limitation governed and that the indictment could not be dismissed
on that account. 19 3 The court further held that the incorporation of
state law was limited to definitional purposes.'94 Additionally, the
court set down a common sense test for determining whether a par-
ticular state law violation falls within the generic categories of
RICO: "[t]he test for determining whether the charged acts fit into
the generic category of the predicate offense is whether the indict-
ment charges a type of activity generally known or characterized in
the proscribed category."195
The legislative history does not clarify what securities violations
are contemplated by RICO.' 9 6 Aside from a passing reference to
securities fraud in the section analysis,1 97 the Senate Report only in-
timates that theft of securities is an activity commonly engaged in by
organized crime. 198 The statute as drafted, however, reaches beyond
that singular focus' 99 and purports to invoke other prohibitions
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (1976).
193. 560 F.2d at 1134. Accord, United States v. Malestesta, 583 F.2d 748, 758 (5th Cir.
1978), modified 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 91
(1979); United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1066-67 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 836
(1978).
194. RICO is a federal law proscribing various racketeering acts which have an
effect on interstate or foreign commerce. Certain of those racketeering, or predicate
acts violate state law and RICO incorporates the elements of those state offenses for
definitional purposes. State law offenses are not the gravamen of RICO offenses.
RICO was not designed to punish state law violations; it was designed to punish the
impact on commerce caused by conduct which meets the state's definition of racke-
teering activity. To interpret state law offenses to have more than a definitional pur-
pose would be contrary to the legislative intent of Congress and existing state law.
560 F.2d at 1135 (footnotes omitted). Accord, United States v. Goldfarb, 464 F. Supp. 565,
570-72 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (federal court will not be bound by Nevada Supreme Court con-
struction of a Nevada gambling statute for the purposes of a federal racketeering charge under
18 U.S.C. § 1952). Goldfarb reasoned that a difference exists between acquiescence for the
preservation of state/federal comity and interpretation to effectuate a far ranging federal pro-
gram. Id Apparently, the court regarded the Nevada interpretation as an evisceration of the
Travel Act and a frustration of federal policies. Id
195. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d at 1137. Thus, the generic definition of bribery
included statutory versions as well as common-law bribery. Id at 1137-38 n.24.
196. See note 80 supra.
197. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 158.
198. Organized crime seems to act like a vulture that preys on those otherwise more
vulnerable by many of the economic developments of the last half century. It is most
disturbing, however, to learn that organized crime has begun to penetrate securities
firms and the Stock Exchange itself. J. Edgar Hoover has testified: "We have over 30
pending cases (March I, 1969) involving thefts of securities from brokerage houses.
Close associates and relatives of La Cosa Nostra figures are known to be involved in
at least II of these cases. Apparently no area is immune.
Id at 77 (footnotes omitted). See also McClellan, supra note 37, at 143.
199. The narrow legislative history should not control over the broad statute especially in
under the federal securities laws.2"' Indeed theft of securitiesper se
is not a violation of the federal securities laws and the Securities and
Exchange Commission declines responsibility in the area. 20 ' The
full power of the Securities and Exchange Commission has, how-
ever, been brought to bear on all forms of organized crime.20 2 Thus,
one should take the language of section 1961(1)(D) at its face value
and not look to legislative history for supposed clarification: RICO
applies to cases consisting of "fraud in the sale of securities. 20 3
4. Directly or Indirectly-(a) invests in, or (b) maintains an inter-
est in, or (c) paricq'ates in. . . Three conjugate concepts exist under
section 1962: investment of income derived from racketeering, 2° ac-
quisition or maintenance of an interest in an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity,205 and participating in or operating
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.2° Although
similar in some material respects and susceptible of concurrent ap-
plication, each of the substantive prohibitions is designed to control
distinct types of criminal activity. The basic distinction within sec-
tion 1962 is that each of subsections a and b prohibit means of infil-
tration of enterprises while subsection c proscribes certain modes of
operation of the affected enterprise.20 7 Subsections a and b can be
view of the congressional pronouncement that the statute be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a),
84 Stat. 947 (1970). Cf. United States v. Chovanec, 461 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (a
narrow interpretation of section 1962 to restrict application only to organized crime is im-
proper when the clear language of the statute calls for a broader application). See generally
Infiltration of Legitimate Business, supra note 37, at 199.
200. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1976).
201. The commission also frequently supplies information from its extensive files
on publicly-held companies and broker-dealers to the Justice Department and other
agencies engaged in fighting organized crime. A potential contribution of great sig-
nificance relates to the problem of securities theft. Securities worth hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars are stolen each year from brokerage firms, banks, insurance
companies, and other institutions. Organized crime is responsible for much of this
theft. Although the Commission has no direct responsibility in the area of stolen
securities, its current efforts looking toward the immobilization of stock certificates in
central depositories will greatly reduce the opportunities for securities theft.
38 SEC ANN. REP. 87-88 (1973).
202. See Task Force Report, supra note 37, at 106-07; Wilson, upra note 37 at 45 n.15
(quoting Exec. Order No. 11,534, 35 Fed. Reg. 8,865 (1970) (creating a National Council on
Organized Crime and appointing the Chairman of the SEC as a member thereof)). Pursuant
to executive order, the Commission established an organized crime program that handled, on a
priority basis, investigation of organized crime activity in the securities market. 35 SEC ANN.
REP. 24 (1970). It was not until fiscal 1972, however, that the Commission reported any suc-
cess to Congress. See 38 SEC ANN. REP. 87-88 (1973). Since that time, the organized crime
program has had modest results. See 43 SEC ANN. REP. 225 (1978); 42 SEC ANN. REP. 125
(1977); 41 SEC ANN. REP. 120-21 (1976); 40 SEC ANN. REP. 96 (1975); 39 SEC ANN. REP. 89
(1974).
203. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1976).
204. Id § 1962(a).
205. Id § 1962(b).
206. Id § 1962(c).
207. One court has characterized the distinction in terms of insider and outsider activity.
Viewing section 1962 synoptically, we (see that subsection (a) and (b)] . . .relate to
further distinguished from one another by looking to the means by
which the enterprise is corrupted.20 8
Section 1962(a), investment of income, has not been frequently
used and few reported decisions have arisen under that prohibi-
tion.20 9 The major drawback to maintaining an action under that
provision is the requirement that income, whether in the form of
cash or otherwise, must be traced from the racketeering activity to
the investment in an enterprise.210 In other words, the prosecutor or
plaintiff would have to show that a pattern of racketeering produced
income that defendant subsequently used to acquire any interest in
or establish or operate any enterprise the activities of which affect
interstate or foreign commerce. In most contexts, direct proof of
tracing is impossible due to the fungible nature of money and the
failure of organized crime figures to maintain records that accurately
reflect the source of illgotten gains.21 2 Thus, a section 1962(a) case
acquisition of an interest in or control of an enterprise by an outsider. They forbid
"takeovers," to use a term familiar in corporate law. Subsection (c),_on the other
hand, looks inward and forbids "behavioral" wrongdoing by persons connected with
the enterprise itself, to use a term familiar in antitrust analysis.
United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715, 720 (W.D. Pa.), rev'don other grounds, 560 F.2d
1127 (3d Cir. 1977), after remand, 594 F.2d 947 (3d Cir. 1979).
208. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) with 18 U.S.C. § 1962(D) (1976).
The objective of this provision [section 1962(a) is to prevent criminal syndicates
from obtaining a foothold in legitimate enterprises by using funds from racketeering
activities for investment purposes. The critical element of the offense is the illegiti-
mate source of investment capital. The acquisitions of the enterprise may otherwise
be totally legal. Thus, this section is distinct from section 1962(b) which criminalizes
the illegal acquisition or maintenance of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity. The prerequisite for the application of subsection (a) is the use of income
from racketeering activity to obtain control of a business. Subsection (b) does not
demand the use of income for the procurement of the business ...
Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 355 (emphasis in original and footnote omitted).
209. Id at 356-57 (discussing three unreported district court decisions that are abstracted
in a Department of Justice internal publication). Cf. Investing Dirty Money, supra note 37, at
1494 n.19 (1974) (noting that in the four years since enactment, no actions had been brought
under section 1962(a)).
In one recently reported decision, a conviction arising from section 1962(a) was affirmed.
United States v. Goins, 593 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1979). In Goins, the government showed "over-
whelming evidence. . . that Goins accepted bribes. . . and in return Goins permitted Scharf
to sell [untaxed cigarettes] . . . the funds received from Scharf [were used] in part to finance
the purchase of a tavern that was then operated by Joyce Harlston." Id. at 89-90. The court
made no further mention of RICO. Similarly, in United States v. Ostrer, 481 F. Supp. 407,
412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court sustained a section 1962(a) indictment over a motion to
dismiss. The court merely noted that the indictment clearly tracked the language of the statute
and was, therefore, sufficient to inform defendants of the essential elements of the crime to
enable them to adequately prepare for trial. Id at 413.
210. See Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 356-57; Investing Dirty Money, supra note
37, at 1510-15. But see United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980) (evidence of
indirect investment of racketeering proceeds sufficient to establish section 1962(a) violation).
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976). See also notes 209 and 210 supra.
212. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 356-57.
[Tihe statute contemplates situations in which the racketeering monies will not be
directly or immediately employed to establish or operate [an] interstate enterprise.
Thus, the statute on its face does not require immediate or even direct use of illicit
income to establish a violation of its terms. Nor does it even require that the actual
illicit income itself be used or invested in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce;
the statute is satisfied if the proceeds from such income are so used or invested. To
often turns upon inferences that are to be drawn from the circum-
stances surrounding the transactions.2"3 This would often require
proof that defendant otherwise lacked the wherewithal to make such
an investment. 214 In its recent annual reports, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission has noted that its organized crime program has
been hampered because the paper trail often stops short of incrimi-
nation.21 5 In some securities contexts, however, the case may be eas-
ier to establish than prior efforts under section 1962(a) because of the
variety of documentary items that the industry generates, such as
purchase orders, confirmations of sale, broker or dealer ledger en-
tries, and records of securities transfer agents. While proving a sec-
tion 1962(a) case will undoubtedly be difficult, it should not be
ignored or abandoned on that score alone.216
Unlike section 1962(a), section 1962(b) imposes no requirement
of tracing.21 7 Indeed, the means of acquisition or maintenance of an
interest in an enterprise 2'8 proscribed by the latter measure are not
as subtle as the former.219 Section 1962(b) forbids the use of racke-
teering activity itself to acquire or maintain an interest in an enter-
220prise.  Section 1962(b) is particularly well suited to the securities
require . . . that the evidence show a direct employment of illicit income is to ignore
the clear proscription of the statute and, as a practical matter, would render the stat-
ute ineffective against the use of interim depositories, commingled funds, and other
surreptitious accounting techniques designed to create significant obstacles to the
tracing of illicit income. Such an analysis is contrary to the plain meaning of the
statute and inconsistent with the liberal purpose of the RICO Act. . . . We therefore
hold that evidence of indirect investment of the proceeds of racketeering activity into
an enterprise affecting interstate commerce is sufficient to establish a violation of
Section 1962(a).
United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621, 628-29 (7th Cir. 1980).
213. Id at 357; Investing Dirty Money, supra note 37, at 1511-13.
214. See notes 209-213 supra.
215. E.g., 38 SEC ANN. REP. 86-87 (1973), which states the following:
The prosecution of securities cases is often based on circumstantial evidence re-
quiring extensive investigation by highly trained personnel. The difficulties in such
prosecutions are compounded when elements of organized crime are involved. Wit-
nesses are usually reluctant to cooperate because of threats or fear of physical harm.
Books, records, and documentary evidence essential for successful prosecution may
be destroyed or nonexistent. The organized criminal element is prone to disguise
transactions by using nominees and taking advantage of foreign bank secrecy laws.
It frequently operates through "fronts" and infiltrates legitimate business concerns.
Organized crime has an extensive network of affiliates throughout this country in all
walks of life, and in many foreign nations.
Accord, 43 SEC ANN. REP. 224 (1978); 42 SEC ANN. REP. 124 (1977); 41 SEC ANN. REP. 119-
20 (1976); 40 SEC ANN. REP. 95-96 (1975); 39 SEC ANN. REP. 89 (1974).
216. Cf. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 356 n. 135 (noting a case in which tracing
was proved directly because the bribes were paid by checks directly deposited to the account of
the enterprise).
217. See McClellan, supra note 36, at 144-45.
218. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1970).
219. See Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 355-56, 358.
220. A prime example is the early case of United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). The court summarized the fact pattern as follows:
The evidence established that Parness gained control of Hotel Corp. by (i) withhold-
ing funds due Hotel Corp., (2) loaning a portion of these funds to Goberman [the
victim of the fraud), and (3) thereafter preventing him from repaying the loan by
context. Defective tender offers,22 ' mergers, 222 or freeze-outs 223 are
likely candidates for RICO treatment. Moreover, proxy solicitation
cases could be actionable under RICO if the fraudulent scheme en-
ables defendant to "maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of an enterprise .. 224 Similarly, if a defendant fraudu-
lently induces a shareholder to sell his securities to defendant in vio-
lation of the federal securities laws, a RICO claim for treble
damages may lie.225 Thus, whenever mail, wire or securities frauds
are perpetrated to acquire or continue control of a corporation,
RICO may provide a remedy in addition to or in lieu of existing
remedies under the federal securities laws.
The most fertile area of RICO litigation, however, has arisen
under section 1962(c). Only two elements must be shown: defend-
ant's association with an enterprise and the existence of a pattern of
racketeering activity.226 Any acts of racketeering activity will suffice
as long as they are connected to the conduct of the affairs of the
affected enterprise.2 27 The exact relationship required is not clear.
In United States v. Ladmer, 228 the court stated that the racketeering
activity must be related to an essential function of the enterprise.229
In United States v. Field,230 however, the court stated that the prose-
cution did not have to prove that the racketeering activity advanced
the interests of the enterprise nor that the enterprise authorized the
acts. 231 In Field, employment by the enterprise and proof of com-
mission of the racketeering activities in the course of employment
sufficed.232 In United States v. Dennis,233 however, mere proof of
continuing to conceal marker collections and by denying him access to other funds
which Parness had remitted ...
Id at 438. Fitting these facts into the RICO framework, defendants acquired an interest in an
enterprise (a Carribbean casino) through a pattern of racketeering activity (two instances of
interstate transportation of stolen property and one instance of traveling interstate in further-
ance of a scheme to defraud). The racketeering activities were part of a larger plan to conceal
the use of withheld funds to make a loan that was subsequently foreclosed thereby giving
Parness control of the casino. 1d at 434-36.
221. Eg., H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
222. Eg., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
223. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 6, at 987, 999-1002.
224. See generally id at 872-75.
225. Eg., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953). See generally R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, supra note 6, at 855-61.
226. United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1976).
227. United States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230, 1240-44 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (government
failed to prove a nexus between the acts of racketeering activity and the conduct of the affairs
of the enterprise); United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Sup. 197, 199 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
228. 429 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
229. Id at 1245 (dicta). Accord, United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). But see An Analysis of RICO, supra note 37, at 109-11.
230. 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aj7dmemn, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dirmissed,
439 U.S. 801 (1978).
231. Id at 58.
232. Id at 57-8.
233. 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978). Accord United States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp.
1230 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
employment and the racketeering activity did not suffice. Field and
Dennis are reconcilable in that the racketeering activity in Field, la-
bor bribery, related directly to defendant's role within the affected
enterprise, while in Dennis the racketeering, usurious loans to coem-
ployees, was not directly related. But for the employment relation-
ship in Field, defendant's conduct would not have been culpable. By
contrast, Dennis' activity would have been illegal notwithstanding
the fact of employment. By allowing the flexible standard, the Field
court has been true to the congressional mandate that RICO be lib-
erally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.2 3 4
The securities cases brought under RICO are consistent with the
more liberal standard of Field In United States v. Pray,235 defendant
utilized his position as a broker-dealer to obtain customers' funds,
which he subsequently converted to his own use. Similarly, the indi-
vidual defendants in Farmers Bank of Delaware v. Bell Mortgage
Corp., 236 were all employees, officers, or directors and allegedly con-
trolling persons of corporate defendants who were allegedly in the
business of selling the mortgages to plaintiff and others.2 37 Finally,
in United States v. De Palma,238 the court held that an indictment
charging defendants who had formed the corporation that acted as
the vehicle of the securities frauds and the bankruptcy fraud was
sufficient even though the alleged frauds were not part of the day to
day affairs of the enterprise. 239 These cases indicate that a successful
1962(c) case will be established only when the enterprise alleged is
the engine of the fraudulent scheme.24
Each subsection of 1962 reaches direct and indirect participa-
tion in the prohibited activities. The only case that questions the
application of RICO to indirect participation is United States v.
Chovanec. 241 In that case, defendant contended that he was not
234. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947 (1970). See
generally An Analysis of RICO supra, note 37, at 110-11.
235. 452 F. Supp. 788 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
236. 452 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978). See also Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage
Corp., No. 76-112 (D. Del. April 25, 1978).
237. Plaintiff's complaint at 3-8, 11, Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F.
Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978).
238. 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118
(2d Cir. 1980).
239. Id at 785-86.
240. This construction would be consistent with the language of section 1962(c), which
states in pertinent part: "To conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity .... ." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). See
United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 395 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3602
(March 18, 1980); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 990 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978). But
see United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 850 (7th Cir. 1977) (since government only proved
that the enterprise, a mobile home park, was the situs of gambling, the case must be dis-
missed), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); United States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230, 1240-44
(S.D. Ohio 1980); United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197, 199 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
241. 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
within the statutory reach because he did not operate or manage the
affected enterprise. The court flatly rejected that contention on the
grounds that the statute bars both direct and indirect participa-
tion.242  Similarly, in United States v. Parness,24 3 the court affirmed
the conviction of a defendant who acted as the courier of the checks
utilized in the fraudulent scheme and who also signed various docu-
ments in an effort to legitimize the appearance of the transaction.
Congress undoubtedly used the direct and indirect language to
achieve the broadest scope possible in order to assure the maximum
remedial potential of the statute. 244 Thus, the prohibitions of section
1962 can and should be applied to collateral participants 245 and to
racketeering activity whatever form it may take.24
5. Enterprise. . . The third essential building block of any
RICO case is the concept of enterprise.247 Section 1961(4) states that
"'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, asso-
ciation, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity. ' 248 The enterprise con-
cept is all inclusive.249 The courts, relying upon the broad scope of
section 1961(4), the repeated use of the term "any" in section 1963,
and the congressional mandate of liberal construction,25 ° have con-
sistently held that RICO applies to all enterprises, legal,
25' illegal,2 2
242. Id. at 44.
243. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). See notes 57 and 220
and accompanying text supra.
244, See note 234 supra.
245, Congress was apparently aware of the potential problems of collateral participants
and the scope of the statute. The Department of Justice objected to the unqualified use of the
direct or indirect language in section 1962(a) only. See Senate Report, supra note 38, at 122-23
(Kleindienst Letter). An amendment was proposed and adopted that limited the scope of sec-
tion 1962(a) to those situations in which defendant participated as a principal under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1976). Id at 123. See generally Investing Dirty Money, supra note 37, at 1495-97. Simi-
larly, Congress demonstrated its ability to narrow the reach of the statute when it changed the
definition of pattern of racketeering activity from one act to two required acts "largely because
the net would be too large and the remedies disproportionate to the gravity of the offense."
Senate Report, supra note 38, at 158. Congress was aware that the organized crime families,
the acknowledged targets of the statute, were highly sophisticated and diversified organiza-
tions. Id at 76-83. Accord, United stats v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied,
575 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 953 (1978). Had Congress desired to further
limit RICO, .it could have done so.
246. RICO was designed with a broad scope in mind to reach illegal infiltration or opera-
tion of enterprises in interstate commerce regardless of the means employed to achieve those
proscribed objectives. See Senate Report, supra note 38, at 76-83. Accord, United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.) (diversified criminal combine securely within the grasp of
RICO), rehearing denied, 575 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
247. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 158; Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 350.
248. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
249. Cf. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 350-51 (the use of "includes" rather than
"means" connotes an expansive interpretation).
250. See note 234 supra.
251. The "legal" enterprise cases usually concern infiltration by organized crime into le-
gitimate facets of the economy, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cerl.
public,2 53 private,2" 4 corporate, 255 individual, 256 domestic, and for-
2-1eign. 5 As a result, virtually no enterprise escapes the scope of the
statute.
One group of cases has questioned the applicability of RICO to
illegal enterprises. 25" The Fifth Circuit,259 joined by five other cir-
cuits, 26 ° has led the way in the attack on wholly illegitimate com-
bines. The courts have advanced many arguments in support of that
result. First, the plain language of the statute gives the term "enter-
prise" a very broad, but not ambiguous definition.26' Second, Con-
gress' repeated use of the term "any" when describing the enterprise
and the prohibited activity demonstrates that all forms of racketeer-
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975), or corrupt activities of legitimate enterprises, e.g., United States
v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441, U.S. 933 (1979).
252. E.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 575 F.2d 300
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
253. E.g., United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977).
254. E.g., United States v. De Palma, 561 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
255. E.g., United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
256. See Atkinson, supra note 37, at 12, 14-15. Any lone individual could qualify. 18
U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). Most often, however, individuals are swept up as parts of "groups of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. See, e.g., United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (March 25, 1980).
257. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975).
258. Perhaps the most frequently litigated question under RICO is the scope of the term
"enterprise." Indeed, as this article was prepared, three circuits ruled on the issue for the
first time. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, (1st Cir. 1980) (RICO applies only to
corruptions of legitimate enterprises); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980)
(enterprise requires that an association have an ascertainable structure and purposeful exist-
ence directed toward an economic goal distinct from the racketeering activity); United States v.
Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1980) (RICO entails illegitimate enterprises). Additionally,
the Sixth Circuit en banc has reversed a controversial panel ruling in United States v. Sutton,
- F.2d - 28 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2265 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'g, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
259. United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Maletesta,
583 F.2d 748, 754 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (panel), modfied, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.) (en banc)
(evidentiary issue), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 91 (1979); United States v.
Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir.), modified, 582 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897-98 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 575 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.) rehearing denied, 562
F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d
436 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
260. They are the D.C., Second, Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, respectively. See
United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d
298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Salano, 605 F.2d 1141
(9th Cir. 1979); cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 677 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933
(1979); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977);
United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976);
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). But
see United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, - F.2d _ 28 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) 2265 (6th Cir. 1980). See also note 258 supra. Thus, seven circuits embrace the more
expansive view; two, a more limited view. Only the Tenth Circuit has yet to reach the ques-
tion.
261. E.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 305 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S.Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897 & n.17 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 575 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1073 (5th Cir.), rehear-
ing denied, 562 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978).
hmg conduct are to come within the statute.2 62 Third, the statute is
silent as to any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate enter-
prises.263 Fourth, Congress could have limited the statutory reach by
inserting a single word, legitimate, in section 1961(4), but it chose not
to do so.264 And, fifth, Congress specifically included a provision
mandating that the statute be liberally construed to effectuate its re-
medial purposes.265
The alternative view, that illegitimate enterprises are not within
RICO, is likewise supported by an array of arguments. In United
States v. Castellano, 266 the court collected and rejected a number of
the arguments:
We gather that the reasons for these different interpretations
of Section 1962 are predicated upon the following: (i) reference in
the House and Senate Reports to infiltration of racketeering
money into legitimate business; (ii) potential prosecution of illegit-
imate enterprises under other more specific federal criminal stat-
utes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1955 and 892, and also under state
criminal statutes; (iii) disturbance of the delicate federal and state
relationships by prosecution of these activities under federal stat-
utes instead of state statutes; (iv) necessity for leniency in interpre-
tation of penal statutes; and finally, (v) the erroneous nature of the
opinion in United States v. Cappello, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1974), resulting from the Court's reliance upon the legislative his-
tory of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 instead of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. We are not
persuaded by any of these reasons.267
Another proffered, but often rejected argument is that even though
particular conduct fits within the letter of the statute it may be be-
yond its reach because the conduct does not fall within the spirit of
the statute.
268
262. Eg., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Swi-
derski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied 575 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977).
263. E.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303-05 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S.Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
264. Eg., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Altese,
542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Castel-
lano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
265. E.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 306 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S.Ct. 1345 (1980); United States. v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979).
266. 416 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
267. Id at 129.
268. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct.
1345 (1980) (citing Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)). Holy Trinity
concerned a statute that prohibited the importation and migration of aliens under contract to
work in the United States. The church had engaged an Englishman to become its minister.
The Court reversed the judgment imposing the statutory penalty. In so doing, Mr. Justice
Brewer wrote the following oft-cited words:
It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.
In one court, however, these alternative arguments held sway.
In United States v. Sutton,2 69 the Sixth Circuit rejected the views of
the other circuits and held "that an enterprise within the meaning of
the statute is 'any individual, partnership, corporation, association
. ..and any union or group of individuals associated in fact,' that is
organized and acting for some ostensibly lawful purpose, either for-
mally declared or informally recognized."27 The court first rea-
soned that the concept of enterprise required that the enterprise have
a purpose and that if the RICO enterprise was construed to include
combinations whose sole purpose was to achieve criminal objectives,
then the enterprise element would be redundant when compared
with the required pattern of racketeering activity.27" ' "Under [that]
approach, . . . every 'pattern of racketeering activity' becomes an
'enterprise' whose affairs are conducted through the 'pattern of rack-
eteering activity.' Plainly, that is not the statute Congress has writ-
ten. '72 The Sixth Circuit, therefore, sought to give effect to all of
the elements of the RICO offense.273 The court also relied upon the
legislative history, which "is remarkable for the clarity with which it
speaks to the issue of the intended scope of the 'enterprise' element
of the crime." '274 The court cited both congressional reports and the
statement of findings and purpose to conclude that Congress was
concerned only with infiltration and corruption of legitimate enter-
prises.275 The court further reasoned that the statute was ambiguous
in this respect and, therefore, conventional canons of construction in
This has been often asserted, and the reports are full of cases illustrating its applica-
tion. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for
frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to
include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from
giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the
legislator intended to include the particular act ...
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). To glean that intent, the
Court found that one should look to "the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be
remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, (and] the reports of the com-
mittee of each house .... " Id at 465. Unlike the Court in Holy Trinity, the Seventh Circuit
in Aleman found that the statute should not be so narrowly applied because the conduct al-
leged was such that history and experience have condemned. Compare Aleman, 609 F.2d at
304 with Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 472.
269. 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979). Accord United States v. Hill, 605 F.2d 557 (6th Cir.
1979) (tabular decision; full text on LEXIS; following Sutton). See also United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
270. 605 F.2d at 270.
271. Id at 266.
272. Id at 265-66.
273. Id at 267, 269. See also Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 354.
274. 605 F.2d at 266-67. Accord United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
275. 605 F.2d at 267-68. Accord United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 574 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Ely, J., dissenting); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1976), (Van Graafei-
land, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
favor of lenity should be applied.276 A final reason advanced was
that an expansive reading of RICO would invade traditional state
jurisdiction.277 The court thus reluctantly reversed the convic-
tions.278
The reluctance of the Sutton court was not misplaced. 279 Sutton
is wrong280 and each case coming after it has correctly rejected its
result.28 ' First, the Sutton court incorrectly reads RICO because
neither enterprises nor patterns of racketeering activity are prohih-
ited. What RICO does condemn is the effects of racketeering activ-
ity upon interstate commerce.282 RICO properly does that through
the prohibitions of section 1962.283 Moreover, not all patterns of
racketeering activity necessarily entail the enterprise.284 Sutton also
fails to give effect to the language of section 1961(4) that speaks of
enterprises in terms of possessing the ability to hold title to property.
That provision suggests that an enterprise can, and often will, exist
separate and independent of the racketeering activity. This is partic-
ularly true in the case of enterprises that are the objects of infiltra-
tion 285  and enterprises that operate as fronts for illegitimate
286activities. Another major flaw in Sutton is its unnecessary resort
to legislative history.287 No court has held the statute to be ambigu-
ous. 288 Section 1961(4) unequivocably includes groups of individu-
als associated in fact. The statutory definition imputes no required
purpose to the enterprise. To reach its conclusion, the court in Sut-
ton had to rely upon legislative history narrower than the statute,
289
which is blatantly improper especially in light of the statutory man-
276. 605 F.2d at 265-66, 269. Another canon of construction urged by various dissenters is
esudem generis. See note 275 supra.
277. 605 F.2d at 270.
278. 605 F.2d at 264, 270.
279. See United States v. Sutton, - F.2d _ 28 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2265 (6th Cir. 1980),
rev'g, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
280. See Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 34, at 354. See notes 281-294 and accompany-
ing text infra. See note 279 supra.
281. United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 305 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Clemente, No. 79-0142, slip op. at
5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1979). See also note 258 supra.
282. See note 294 infra.
283. See notes 204-246 and accompanying text supra.
284. See United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 197), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951
(1978); United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978). In both cases, the govern-
ment failed to prove a connection between the racketeering activity and the enterprise alleged.
285. E.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d. Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S.
1105 (1975).
286. E.g., United Stats v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
933 (1979); United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909
(1979); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. De
Palma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Pray, 542 F. Supp. 780 (M.D. Pa.
1978).
287. See note 80 supra.
288. See Atkinson, supra note 37, at 4-5.
289. See notes 85-87 and accompanying text supra
date of broad construction. 290 The court also ignored other intrinsic
evidence such as the section title, which is relevant in determining
legislative intent.29' Finally, although the potential exists for over-
lapping jurisdiction between the states and the federal government,
no substantial interference occurs with any conduct presently regu-
lated by a state. RICO adopts, for definitional purposes only, certain
292 RC ostate crimes. RICO does not punish murder, arson or bribery. In-
stead, it punishes the effect that those predicate crimes, and others,
293 ihave upon interstate commerce. This is a power properly exer-
cised by the federal government under the commerce clause.294
Similar arguments have been advanced when the alleged enter-
prise is a governmental entity rather than a commercial entity. Con-
sistently the courts have brought governmental entities within the
definition of enterprise.295 Courts look to the findings of Con-
gress, 29 6 the unqualified definition of enterprise, 297 and the broad
construction provision 298 to support their conclusions. Additionally,
290. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
291. The title of the chapter is Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations. Orga-
nized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (emphasis added).
See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §§ 47.12, 47.14 (4th ed. 1973).
Accord, House v Commissioner, 453 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1972). See generally Blakey &
Goldstock, supra note 34, at 354 n. 116.
292. See, e.g., United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135, 1137 (3d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Field, 432 F. Sup. 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afdmem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 439 U.S. 802 (1978).
293. See, e.g., United States v. Maletesta, 583 F.2d 748, 754 (5th Cir. 1978) (panel), modi-
fied, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (evidentiary issue), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967, cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 91 (1979); United Staes v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135 (3d Cir. 1977):
United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976).
294. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975); United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1974) (18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970), dealing
with gambling and racketeering). See generally Atkinson, supra note 37, at 5-6.
295. United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321 (4th Cir. 1979) (police), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 1041 (1980); United States v. Grazywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 1979) (police); United
States v. Carter, 602 F.2d 799 (7th Cir.) (taxi licensing), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 457 (1979)
United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir.) (warden), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978);
United States v. Burnsed, 566 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1977) (police), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1077
(1978); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977) (state bureau of cigarette
taxes), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 415 (5th Cir.)
(police), rehearing denied, 559 F.2d 29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978): United
States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977) (police): United States v. Sisk, 476 F. Supp.
1061, 1062 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (governor); United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.W.
Va. 1979) (state alcohol beverage commissioner); United States v. Feliziani, 472 F. Supp. 1037
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (police); United States v. Nacrelli, 468 F. Supp. 241 (E.D.Pa. 1979) (police,
mayor); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.) (traffic court judge), af,'dmem..
605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1015 (1980); United States v. Salvitti, 451
F.2d 195, 199 (E.D. Pa.) (redevelopment authority), aff'dmem., 588 F.2d 822 and 824 (3d Cir.
1978); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 193 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (state legislator).
296. Eg., United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 415 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 559 F.2d 29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 904 (1978).
297. E.g., United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1090-91 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
298. See note 296 supra.
the Third Circuit has noted that governmental entities have the same
potential effect upon interstate commerce and are exposed to the
same danger of infiltration or corruption as commercial entities.
299
An argument against this construction is that the remedial provisions
of RICO are not properly suited to governmental enterprises.
300
These cases express particular concern over the potential dissolution
remedy provided by sections 1963 and 1964.301 They, however, im-
properly confuse the crime and the punishment; the liability and the
remedy. Inadequate or improper punishment or remedy should not
deny all relief when it is appropriate to award some relief. RICO
punishments and remedies are adaptable to governmental enterprise
cases.
302
The third group of RICO enterprise cases raises the question of
whether the statute is limited to entities alone or whether individual
offenders 3 3 qualify. A single corporation or other entity may consti-
tute an enterprise. 30 4 A group of corporations have been held to be
an enterprise, 3°5 as has a group comprised of individuals and corpo-
306rations. Several cases have held that groups of individuals, associ-
ated in fact, constitute enterprises for the purpose of the statute.30 7
Although no case has yet been decided, one commentator has sug-
gested that a single individual could constitute a RICO enterprise.30 8
A RICO securities plaintiff will enjoy considerable flexibility in
determining which enterprise or enterprises should be alleged. As a
result of this flexibility the plaintiff should be able to frame the
pleading to meet almost any set of circumstances. For example, in a
tender offer or proxy solicitation, a section 1962(a) or (b) case could
be brought naming the target company as the enterprise in which the
recreants obtain or maintain an interest or control. The issuance and
distribution of stock could generate a 1962(c) case in which the un-
derwriters and/or the issuer would be the enterprise the affairs of
299. United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978).
300. E.g., United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 685-86 (7th Cir. 1979) (rejecting con-
tention; RICO applied). See also Atkinson, supra note 37, at 13-14.
301. See generally Atkinson, supra note 37, at 13-14.
302. Id at 13.
303. ld at 14-15.
304. Eg., United States v. De Palma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (corporation); Cf.
United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (union).
305. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W.
3602 (March 18, 1980).
306. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 137-38 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
307. E.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct.
1345 (1980); United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir, 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 677
(1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 884 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 575 F.2d 300 (5th
Cir.), ceri. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
308. Atkinson, supra note 37, at 14-15. See United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 138
(N.D. Ga. 1979). Section 1961(4) places no requirement of plurality. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)
(1976).
which are conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity. Bro-
kerage houses and investment advisors would likewise be susceptible
to section 1962(c) treatment. In proxy contests, the insurgent group
or the incumbent management could be characterized as an associa-
tion in fact for the purposes of section 1962(c) or the corporation
itself could be the enterprise for the purposes of section 1962(b). Al-
though the facts will often present a number of possible enter-
prises,30 9 the choice should be carefully made so that the other pieces
of the RICO puzzle can neatly fall into place.310
6. The Affairs of Which Affect Interstate Commerce. -The
RICO cause of action requires an effect upon interstate commerce to
provide federal jurisdiction. As in other areas of RICO interpreta-
tion, the courts have been liberal in determining whether this ele-
ment has been met. One court has sustained an indictment in which
the jurisdictional elements were conclusively alleged, because the de-
tails need not be alleged so long as sufficient information is provided
to enable defendant to prepare for trial. 31' Other courts have en-
gaged in little more than sheer conjecture to determine that the juris-
dictional element is present.31 2 While the connection can be
minimal, it nevertheless must be present. In United States v.
Vignola,3 13 the court noted that the connection must be between the
enterprise and interstate commerce not between the racketeering ac-
tivity and commerce.314 Consequently, because a case arising under
the federal securities laws would have a sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce, a RICO securities claim would, by definition, also satisfy
the jurisdictional prerequisite.
In summary, a section 1962 violation requires proof of six ele-
ments: that a person through a pattern of racketeering activity di-
rectly or indirectly invests in, acquires an interest in or conducts the
affairs of an enterprise the activities of which affect interstate com-
309. Eg., Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., No. 76-122, slip op. at 7 (D. Del.
April 25, 1978) (suggesting that multiple enterprises have been alleged).
310. See United States v. Clemente, No. 79-0412, slip op. at 5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. II, 1979).
In Clemente, the court suggested, but the prosecutor declined to seek, a superceding indictment
upon defendant's renewed motion to dismiss relying upon Sutton. As the court analyzed the
facts, the case could properly allege union infiltration in which event the union affected or the
individuals constituting the corrupting influence would be the enterprise. The prosecutor
chose the latter and the court sustained the indictment. For a case in which the choice was
poorly made and the RICO case never jelled, see United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th
Cir. 1977), ceri. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
311. United States v. Ostrer, 481 F. Supp. 407, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
312. Eg., United States v. Frumento, 426 F. Supp. 797, 803 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See also
United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Pa.), a 'dme., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1015 (1980); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
313. 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.), affldmem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 1015 (1980).




Injury and damage are undefined terms under RICO. That
statutory gap, however, should not prevent the courts from awarding
appropriate relief. In the antitrust arena, the express statutory treble
damage action likewise failed to define the concept of injury or dam-
age.316 The right of recovery under the antitrust laws is not based
upon the substantive wrong, but rather upon the injuries resulting
from the wrong. 1 7 Similarly, RICO does not proscribe the predicate
offenses, it merely prohibits the compounding of essentially eco-
nomic violations of criminal laws with legitimate enterprises. 318 It is
this illicit intercourse between economic crimes and legitimate com-
merce to which RICO is addressed and for which civil sanctions
should be imposed. Insofar as the predicate offenses include viola-
tions of the federal securities laws, the wealth of injury and damage
law can be incorporated to flesh out the bare bones of the RICO civil
action.319
C Causation
Section 1964(c), like its antecedent under the antitrust law, con-
tains the requirement that the compensable injuries must be "by rea-
son of. . ." the proscribed conduct.320 This language would appear
to require proof of a connection between the violation and the injury
of which plaintiff complains. 321 In antitrust cases, the injury must be
direct rather than remote or secondary. 322 Similarly, the acts need
not be the sole cause of injury so long as they are shown to be a
material cause; causation in fact with a fair degree of certainty.
323
The hoary concept of proximate cause, therefore, would satisfy the
315. See Atkinson, supra note 37, at 2.
316. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
317. See Foster & Kleiser Co. v. Special Sign Co., 85 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 613 (1937).
318. See Infiltration of Legitimate Business, supra note 37, at 222; Enforcing Criminal Laws,
supra note 37, at 1058.
319. See Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 106-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093 (1977);
Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Securities Cases and the Effects of Damages on
Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 27 (1977); Reder, Measuring Buyers' Damages in 10b-5 Cases,
31 Bus. LAW. 1839 (1976); Comment, The Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving
Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371 (1974); Comment, Measurement of Damages
in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 1968 WASH. L.Q. 165. See also ALl Code, supra note 4,
1702(3), 1708, 1710(c), 1723.
320. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
321. See Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 278 F. Supp. 938 (D.C.
Cal. 1967).
322. See Broyer v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
323. See Response of Car., Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
"by reason of' language.324 As in the area of damages, existing se-
curities case law can be incorporated to further define the concept of
causation for a RICO securities case.3 25
D. Ancillary Issues
Initial RICO civil cases are likely to generate a number of ancil-
lary issues. In view of existing precedent, it is probable that a de-
fendant will assert that the civil provisions of RICO only apply to
members of organized crime.326 A constitutional attack is also
likely.327 Additionally, subsequent cases will define the appropriate
burden of proof,32 8 will determine whether there can be secondary
liability under the RICO statute,329 and will ascertain whether scien-
ter is required. These topics will be addressed seriatim.
1. RICO Is Not a Status Offense. -The legislative history sug-
gests3 3 ° that RICO has its roots in organized crime and racketeering.
One court has accepted that premise and, therefore, limited the reach
of RICO to those persons who could be characterized as members of
a criminal society operating outside of the control of the law. 33 1 In
Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 33 2 plaintiffs alleged violations of antitrust
laws and various executive orders implementing price controls.
Later, they moved to amend the complaint to include a RICO
count.3 33 The court, denying the motion, accepted defendant's con-
tention that RICO was inapplicable because defendant lacked the
requisite status to come within the statute. 33' The court further em-
phasized that to allow amendment would add credence to an infer-
ence of involvement in organized crime, an inference that was
unfounded and patently unfair.335
Commentators have been unanimous in their criticism of Barr.
Admittedly, congressional intent was to combat the activities of
organized are groups such as the "Mafia." However, the only log-
ical way to accomplish this is by concentrating on the types of
324. See Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union of America, 553 F.2d 793
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
325. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 6, at 1047-84.
326. Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See note 330-341 and
accompanying text infra.
327. See notes 342-349 and accompanying text infra.
328. See notes 350-355 and accompanying text infra.
329. See notes 356-368 and accompanying text infra.
330. E.g., Senate Report, supra note 38, at 76-83. See note 37 supra.
331. Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
332. Id
333. The basis for the RICO claim was that defendants perpetrated a mail fraud by mail-
ing overstated bills for telephone answering service charges, received income from the activity,
and used the income in the operation and control of an enterprise engaged in interstate com-
merce. Id at 112.
334. Id
335. Id at 113.
offenses committed by organized crime members. To require a
showing that the defendant is affiliated with organized crime
would unnecessarily burden prosecutions. Furthermore, it would
preclude recourse against some instances of economic harm
merely because the defendant was not identified with a criminal
society. The Barr court appears to have misinterpreted Congress's
plan. Hopefully, other courts will not. 336
Indeed, other courts have not repeated the folly of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. 37
The primary argument advanced by the courts repudiating Barr
is that Congress chose to proscribe conduct rather than status. 3 8 A
status-based definition would be difficult to apply and probably un-
constitutional.339 Since organized crime is an undefined term in
RICO, it has been suggested that the statute sought to outlaw con-
duct normally associated with organized crime and not organized
crime per se. 340  Another line of cases relied upon the liberal con-
struction provisions to support the conduct focus. 34 ' Thus, although
a status-oriented attack can be made under existing RICO civil case
law, it is unlikely that such an attack would succeed.
336. AnAnal'sisofRICO. supra note 37, at 112. Accord, Atkinson, supra note 37, at 9-10;
Investing Dirty Money supra note 37, at 1496-97.
337. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977), rev'g, 429 F. Supp. 715
(W.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. Companale, 518 F.2d 352, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1096-97 (E.D. Pa.,
affidmem.. 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 100 S. Ct. 1015 (1980): Farmers Bank of
Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., No. 76-122, slip op. at 8 (D. Del. April 25, 1976); United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1018-19 (D. Md. 1976) (failure to allege that defendant was affili-
ated with organized crime will not require dismissal of indictment). Cf United States v. Al-
tese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976) (all enterprises that are conducted through a pattern of
racketeering activity are proscribed by the act), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United
States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting argument that RICO is limited to
infiltration of legitimate organizations). Accord, United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th
Cir. 1970) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1952 applies to anyone who commits the proscribed acts).
338. E.g.. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127. 1136 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1096-97 (E.D. Pa.), affdmem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied 100 S. Ct. 1015 (1980); United Staes v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1019 (D. Md. 1976).
339. See United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1019 (D. Md. 1976); Atkinson, supra
note 37, at 9-10.
340. See United States v. Vignola , 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1096-97 (E.D. Pa.), aft'dmem., 605
F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 100 S. Ct. 1015 (1980); Atkinson, supra note 37, at 9-10.
341. E.g.. United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1090-91 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied.
434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (3d Cir. 1977).
This approach was followed in the unreported RICO securities case, Farmers Bank of
Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., No. 76-112, slip op. at 8 (D. Del. April 25, 1978), in which the
court stated the following:
[The defendant, relying upon Barr] . . . suggests that the Act here in question is
aimed only at illegitimate business enterprises or organized crime. Although the lan-
guage of the Act does not attempt to so limit its application, even if I were to follow
Barr, I would conclude that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to withstand a mo-
tion to dismiss the Section 1962(c) claim. Moreover, I do not believe that such a
limitation should be placed upon the express terms of the Act. ...
In a subsequent reported opinion in this case, the court relied upon the unreported opinion to
dispose of a similar motion to dismiss. Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F.
Supp. 1278, 1279-80 (D. Del. 1978).
2. Section 1964(c) is Constitutional.-No reported case has at-
tacked the constitutionality of a private treble damages action under
section 1964(c). It is likely, however, that the provision would sur-
vive such an attack. In United States v. Cappetto,342 section 1964
passed constitutional muster. Cappetto was a government action
seeking divestiture and injunctive relief. The court rejected defend-
ants' argument that section 1964 is a quasi-criminal provision lack-
ing the requisite procedural safeguards attending such an action.
First, Congress has the inherent power to impose both civil and
criminal penalties for activities that adversely affect interstate com-
merce.3 43 Second, the election to pursue a civil remedy is not ren-
dered criminal by the fact that criminal sanctions are available.
344
Section 1964 was not unconstitutionally vague since the subject ac-
tivity was sufficiently described in the substantive provisions that
were incorporated into the grant of jurisdiction in section 1964.141
Cappetto also stands for the proposition that section 1964 is a valid
exercise of congressional commerce clause power. 46 Section 1964(c)
can be sustained as a valid exercise of commerce clause power by
analogy to its antitrust antecedent, 347 which was upheld in Lehrman
v. GulfOil Corp. 348 Additionally, RICO has survived all other con-
stitutional challenges, including ex post facto and double jeopardy
attacks.349
3. Burden of Proof.-No reported RICO civil case35 0 has ad-
dressed the question of whether the proper burden of proof is be-
yond a reasonable doubt or by a mere preponderance. The statute is
silent.35' It is important to distinguish the two standards because the
traditional civil standard is substantially less than the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard borne in the criminal context.352 In the an-
titrust treble damage cases, the Supreme Court has held that the
342. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
343. Id. at 1357.
344. Id
345. Id at 1357-58. Cf. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975) (RICO
not unconstitutionally vague in view of definitional sections), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974) (not vague), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (not vague on grounds
that predicate acts are defined and necessary connection between commission thereof and in-
volvement in an enterprise appear on the face of statute).
346. 502 F.2d at 1356, 1358.
347. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
348. 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1972), cer. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972).
349. Atkinson, supra note 37, at 3-9.
350. See note 32 supra.
351. But cf. ARIz. REV. ST. ANN. § 13-2314.H (1978) (making the preponderance standard
applicable to civil actions for persons injured by racketeering).
352. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 410 F.
Supp. 659 (D. Minn. 1974).
ordinary preponderance of the evidence standard was applicable. 35 3
One case has indicated that this standard will also be applied in
RICO actions.354 This result is consistent with the legislative history
of RICO.
355
4. Secondary Liability.-"As securities law litigation has
grown, imaginative plaintiffs have included greater numbers of per-
sons and corporations as defendants. With increasing frequency, se-
curities fraud complaints are naming as defendants not only primary
wrongdoers, but many whose activities are collateral or secondary to
the primary wrong. ' 356 Numerous statutory and common-law liabil-
ity theories have evolved in order to expand the defendant class to
include fiscally responsible defendants.357
Subsequent RICO cases will have to determine whether "per-
son" as it is used in the designated prohibited activities of section
1962 includes collateral participants and entails vicarious responsi-
bility. 358 RICO is capable of such a broad construction. Each sub-
stantive provision forbids any person from directly or indirectly
353. See Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of America, 401 U.S. 302, 307-11 (1971); Clark
Marine Corp. v. Cargill, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 103, I1I (E.D. La. 1964), afd, 345 F.2d 79 (5th Cir.
1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 1011 (1966); Crawford Transport Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 235 F.
Supp. 751, 754-55 (E.D. Ky. 1962), aff'd, 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
954 (1965); Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 127 F. Supp. 286, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1954),
af'd, 225 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1955); Cape Cod Food Prod. v. National Cranberry Ass'n., 119 F.
Supp. 900, 909 (D. Mass. 1954).
354. Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del.
1978). Cappetto, the case relied upon in Farmers Bank, analogizes the RICO remedy to civil
antitrust, however, it does not discuss the burden of proof question. See United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
355. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 80-81 (noting that the common-law criminal trial is
hampered by necessary restrictions on government power to protect individual rights and stat-
ing that RICO brings to bear on organized crime the full panoply of civil remedies). The
Department of Justice letter of comment recognized that the RICO civil provisions will en-
hance the government's ability to confront organized crime. Id at 125-26 (Kleindienst letter).
Thus, in contrast to a criminal proceeding, the civil procedure under which section
1964 actions are governed, with its lesser standard ofproof, non-injury adjudication
process, amendment of pleadings, etc., will provide a valuable new method of attack-
ing the evil aimed at in this bill. The relief offered by these equitable remedies would
also seem to have a greater potential than that of penal sanctions for actually remov-
ing the criminal figure from a particular organization and enjoining him from engag-
ing in similar activity. Finally, these remedies are flexible, allowing several alternate
courses of action for dealing with a particular type of predatory activity, and they
may also be effectively monitored by the Court to insure that its decrees are not
violated.
Id at 126 (emphasis added) (Kleindienst letter). Accord Atkinson, supra note 37, at 17-18 &
n. 147.
356. Ruder, Multile Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases. Aiding and Abetting, Con-
spiracy, In Pad Dilecto, Indemniflcation, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 599 (1970).
357. Id at 601-46. Accord, R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 6, at 1089-1164. The
statutory bases are section 15 of the 1933 Act and section 20 of the 1934 Act, both of which
deal with the liability of control persons. The common-law theories have rested upon agency
principles, misrepresentation and deceit doctrines, tippee liability theories, aiding and abetting
and conspiracy. See Ruder, supra note 356, at 601. See generally ALl Code supra note 4,
§ 1724.
358. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 48 n.17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
engaging in the prohibited conduct.3 59 Person is broadly defined to
include individuals as well as entities.36 ° Thus, the key will be to
determine congressional intent. Neither direct nor indirect is defined
in RICO. The former entails a natural and proximate or immediate
relationship while the latter denotes some intervening agency or me-
dium so that the relationship is more remote. 36' By using the two in
the disjunctive, Congress must have intended that RICO should pro-
scribe all manifestations of racketeering activity regardless of its
form or manner of operation.362 Moreover, Congress specifically
mandated that the RICO provisions were to be liberally construed to
effectuate the remedial goals. 363 Expansive interpretation to include
collateral and vicarious liability will further these objectives.
Although no RICO case has yet addressed these issues, the
seeds for an expansive construction have been sown. In United
States v. Chovanec,36 the court rejected defendant's argument that
he was exempt because he did not occupy a managerial role in the
affected enterprise. In short, the court held that he could be found
criminally liable as an indirect participant.365 In two other cases,
United States v. Thevis3 6 6 and Farmers Bank of Delaware v. Bell
Mortgage Corp.,367 the courts sustained an indictment and a com-
plaint, respectively, both of which named individual defendants and
corporate defendants with whom the individuals maintained an em-
ployer-employee or similar relationship. If these cases are read as
supportive of a respondeat superior theory, a RICO securities plain-
tiff will have a significant advantage over his traditional counter-
part.
368
5. Scienter.-A final area that subsequent cases will define is
the degree of scienter a defendant must possess to violate RICO. On
its face, the statute requires no particular mental state on the part of
defendant. One court has held that the prosecutor must prove each
element of the predicate act of racketeering activity.369 Thus, to the
359. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1976).
360. Id § 1961(3) (1976). See note 73-74 and accompanying text supra.
361. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 546, 913 (4th ed. 1951).
362. Senate Report, supra note 38, at 76-83, is repleat with references to the variety and
complexity of organized criminal activity. It also recognized the inadequacy of prior attempts
to regulate such conduct and announced a full scale attack to separate criminals from their
economic bases. Id at 78-79. See also Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
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IV. Conclusion
Congress has provided a flexible and powerful tool to combat
the impact of organized crime on our economy. One application of
that tool is in the area of securities fraud. This article has demon-
strated that securities fraud cases can be transformed into racketeer-
ing cases with the attendant benefit of treble damages and an express
rather than an implied cause of action. While several questions will
be raised and answered as the theory evolves, a sufficient statutory
framework and a body of analogous case law exists that will guide
the development of this alternative remedy for securities fraud. As
the courts continue to limit the traditional causes of action, innova-
tive application of all available remedial theories is desirable and
necessary.
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